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IN PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAWS AND POLICIES
Deborah M. Weissman*
Abstract
Intimate partner violence (“IPV”) is often exercised as an act of
coercion by abusers who engage in strategies to interfere with their
partners’ ability to engage productively in the workplace and deny them
control over economic resources, that is, to deny them agency. Certainly,
awareness of the insidious facets of economic coercion of IPV has
expanded in recent years. However, attention to the efficacy of legal and
policy responses to the economic consequences of such abuse has not
received commensurate attention. Federal and state laws designed to
address economic abuse are applied haphazardly if at all. The laws
themselves, moreover, are ill-suited to address the structural issues that
contribute to domestic violence in the first place. Similarly, “economic
justice initiatives” promoted by anti-violence advocates to “respond to,
address, and prevent financial abuse” related to domestic violence fall far
short of their intended goals. These programs ignore the overarching
neoliberal underpinnings of the political economy that burden victims with
the costs of their own remediation through practices designed to benefit
financial markets.
The recent attention to remediating domestic violence, including
economic abuse, illustrates the need to introduce analyses of political
economy into law practices and advocacy strategies. This Article provides
such analysis and considers how market forces constrain and shape legal
remedies and advocacy strategies that address economic abuse. It argues
that, without an understanding of the political economy, programmatic
“advances” may, in fact, exacerbate the economic circumstances of
victims as well as abusers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Violence experienced within the family—perhaps the most intimate of all
social arrangements—causes devastating consequences.1 The pervasive and often
*
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This Article uses the term “intimate partner violence (IPV)” interchangeably with
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permanent impact on the physical and psychological well-being of its immediate
victims2 has been well-documented.3 Recent phenomena, including the #MeToo
movement4 and accounts of perpetrators of mass shootings with a history of
domestic violence, have called new attention to the costs and consequences of
violence against women.5 Intimate violence inflicts long-lasting trauma and wreaks
“domestic violence,” “gender violence,” and “family violence.” Critiques abound about the
appropriateness of any of these terms, particularly the need to avoid imposing a gendered
frame on violence that occurs in intimate relationships. See generally Julie Goldscheid,
Gender Neutrality, the “Violence Against Women” Frame, and Transformative Reform, 82
UMKC L. REV. 623 (2014) (addressing the way gender violence is framed in law, policy,
and popular rhetoric).
2
This Article tends to prefer the term “victim” instead of “survivor,” which is often and
appropriately used to express the dignity and strength of those who have experienced gender
violence. This author is drawn to the term victim, and refers to the explanation offered by
Roxane Gay: “I don’t want to pretend I am on some triumphant, uplifting journey.” As
Jacqueline Rose notes in reviewing Gay’s use of the term, “Far from rendering her passive
or pathetic, naming herself in this way is a form of agency that makes it possible for her to
live and to write.” Jacqueline Rose, I Am a Knife, 40 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 3 (Feb. 22,
2018), https://www.lrb.co.uk/v40/n04/jacqueline-rose/i-am-a-knife [https://perma.cc/LAU7
-F2LN].
3
Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (2014). While domestic abuse can be
perpetrated by any gender and in both heterosexual and same-sex relationships, women, and
especially women in relationships where economic strain permeates, are more likely to be
victims of such violence. Thus, this Article generally focuses on violence perpetrated by men
against women in households experiencing economic uncertainty.
4
#MeToo refers to an “extraordinary cultural moment of resistance against sexual
harassment.” Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.
FORUM 22, 24 (2018). The movement gathered new momentum after the disclosure of sexual
harassment and assault by Hollywood mogul Harvey Weinstein. Id. at 30. The actress Alyssa
Milano sent out a message on Twitter, calling for victims to respond with “me too.” Id.
Milano was not the first to call for a movement response; her work followed Tarana Burke,
a black feminist activist who first initiated the movement in 2007. Id. at 30 n.22. Victims of
domestic violence have also used the hashtag. See, e.g., Rachel Leah, Is #MeToo Moving
into Domestic Violence?, SALON (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.salon.com/2017/12/08/lucymcintosh-mark-houston-metoo-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/ZML7-ETFF].
5
April Fulton, In Texas and Beyond: Mass Shootings Have Roots in Domestic Violence,
NPR (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/11/07/562387350/intexas-and-beyond-mass-shootings-have-roots-in-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/9BUT
-X8QU]; Amanda Taub, Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have
in Common, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2016, at A1. Donald Trump’s “locker room banter” and
his defense of his aide, Rob Porter, who was accused of domestic violence against two former
wives, further illuminated the domains in which the abuse of male power is expressed. David
A. Farenthold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation About Women in
2005, WASH. POST. (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumprecorded-having-extremely-lewd-conversation-about-women-in-2005/2016/10/07/3b9ce77
6-8cb4-11e6-bf8a-3d26847eeed4_story.html?utm_term=.2c3e38b92bd2 [https://perma.cc/
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havoc extending beyond the private spaces of the household, thereupon to lay bare
the structural shortcomings of public institutions: outcomes that contribute to the
erosion of the norms upon which the normative framework of everyday life is
based.6
IPV involves more than physical abuse. Abusers often enact it as part of “a
deliberate pattern of control in which individuals interfere with their partner’s ability
to acquire, use, and maintain economic resources.”7 Efforts of abusive partners who
seek to sabotage a victim’s efforts to engage productively in the workplace are welldocumented.8 Indeed in one study, sixty percent of victims reported loss of
employment as a result of the violence they suffered, and ninety-eight percent
reported some sort of economic abuse, particularly financial abuse.9 Abusers often
deploy a range of tactics and strategies, such as prohibiting a victim’s access to
information about finances or engaging in identity theft.10 The loss of livelihood,
reduced earning capacity, and credit crises attending domestic violence often present
insurmountable obstacles preventing victims from exiting an abusive relationship.11
8THL-GZKT]; see also Maggie Haberman, Trump Talks of Bringing Back Rob Porter, Aide
Accused of Spousal Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03
/26/us/politics/trump-rob-porter.html [https://perma.cc/28TJ-YFXJ].
6
See Amy Ellison, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Our Communities, TNP (Dec.
9,
2015),
https://tnpsocal.org/the-impact-of-domestic-violence-on-our-community/
[https://perma.cc/W3YJ-QWCE]. See generally Marcy L. Karin, Changing Federal
Statutory Proposals to Address Domestic Violence at Work, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 377 (2009)
(discussing how federal regulation can address the “private” problem of violence in the
workplace). Research demonstrates the effects of domestic violence on communities due to
over-policing and over-reliance on the carceral state. See MS. FOUNDATION FOR WOMEN,
SAFETY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WOMEN’S
ANTI-VIOLENCE MOVEMENT AND THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1–4 (2003),
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/Ms_SafetyJusticeForAll_2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/397WSSMQ]; see also Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 852–54 (2001) (noting the
impact of aggressive policing of domestic violence on poor communities and communities
of color).
7
Judy L. Postmus et al., Economic Abuse as an Invisible Form of Domestic Violence:
A Multicountry Review, TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, AND ABUSE 1, 2 (2018).
8
See infra Section I.A.
9
Sady Doyle, Why Domestic Violence Is an Economic Issue, THE NATION (Sept. 20,
2016),
https://www.thenation.com/article/why-domestic-violence-is-an-economic-issue/
[https://perma.cc/NFR4-XMZX].
10
See LISA D. BRUSH, POVERTY, BATTERED WOMEN, AND WORK IN U.S. PUBLIC
POLICY 14, 16 (2011) (articulating the ways that patterns and tactics domestic violence
interfere with women’s economic agency); see also Margo Lindauer, “Please Stop Telling
Her to Leave” Where Is the Money: Reclaiming Economic Power to Address Domestic
Violence, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1263, 1277–78 (2016); Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The
Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence, 100 CAL. L. REV. 951, 952–53 (2012).
11
Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence
Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 4–5 (2007);
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Economic abuse must be understood as a means of coercion by which an abuser
seeks to achieve the subordination of the victim. Effective redress requires
recognition of this type of abuse within the larger political-economic framework.
Both victims and abusive partners often enact symbiotic behaviors within the
political-economic realities of day-to-day life.12 Greer Litton Fox and Michael
Benson have studied the effects of neighborhood economic instability on domestic
violence and suggest that “the private behaviors of couples in their homes cannot be
separated either from their local neighborhood settings or from the larger political
economy and that as economic despair begins to displace economic confidence, an
increase in the prevalence of IPV will not lag far behind.”13 Lisa Brush observes in
the context of poverty and domestic violence, “as economists are the first to point
out, violence affects income at least as much as income affects violence.”14
Domestic violence is most assuredly criminal behavior. Many scholars and
activists, however, have argued that the problem cannot be resolved through
criminal justice strategies alone—or even principally—due to the structural racism
and intrinsic punitive purpose of the criminal justice system.15 As Jacqueline Rose
has suggested, “[i]t is scary, though common enough historically, to witness the
speed with which a progressive cause can become complicit with, or be co-opted by,
a nasty political agenda.”16 Donna Coker and Ahjané Macquoid have observed that
well-meaning efforts to transform an understanding of violence against women from
Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 678
(2008).
12
See Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is Political-and Economic: Rethinking
Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 428–30 (2007).
13
Greer Litton Fox & Michael Benson, Household and Neighborhood Contexts of
Intimate Partner Violence, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 419, 426 (2006).
14
BRUSH, supra note 10, at 69.
15
See, e.g., Donna Coker et al., Introduction: CONVERGE! Reimagining the Movement
to End Gender Violence, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. REV. 249 (2015).
16
See Rose, supra note 2. For articles and books that discuss the harm occasioned by
criminal justice system responses to gender violence, see MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW
JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 47 (rev’d ed. 2012);
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 78 (2006); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241, 1257 (1991); Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class,
and the Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
281, 287 (1997); Leigh Goodmark, Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized?, 40
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 53, 54–55 (2017); Alexandra Grant, Intersectional Discrimination in
U Visa Certification Denials: An Irremediable Violation of Equal Protection? 3 COLUM. J.
RACE & L. 253, 262 (2013); Radha Vishnuvajjala, Insecure Communities: How an
Immigration Enforcement Program Encourages Battered Women to Stay Silent, 32 B.C. J.L.
& SOC. JUST. 185, 208–09 (2012); Weissman, supra note 12, at 401; Coker, supra note 6, at
852–54.
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a private matter to an issue of public concern requiring criminal responses evolved
into a movement that served to drive hyper-incarceration and further expand the
apparatus of the punitive state.17 Thus, current scholarly and advocacy trends have,
in varying degrees, called into question the resort to imprisonment as a means of
relief and remediation. The turn away from criminal punishment has been
accompanied by greater attention to the relevance of poverty and economic concerns
to domestic violence which necessitates reconsideration of the sources of the
problem and a recognition of the need to develop new remedies.18
Domestic violence has been addressed principally as a problem of physical
violence.19 Although more recently, the economic nature of IPV has received
attention, little consideration has been given to the efficacy of the law as a means to
ameliorate the economic consequences of such abuse.20 Federal and state laws
designed to address the economic consequences of domestic violence are often
honored in the breach.21 The laws themselves, moreover, are insufficiently targeted
to address the structural issues that contribute to domestic violence in the first
place.22
Recently, antiviolence advocates have begun to address economic abuse.
National organizations, as well as state and local programs, have embraced
economic justice initiatives that claim to “respond to, address, and prevent financial
abuse” related to domestic violence.23 These “new” economic justice advocacy
17
Donna Coker & Ahjané D. Macquoid, Why Opposing Hyper-Incarceration Should
Be Central to the Work of the Anti-Domestic Violence Movement, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC.
JUST. L. REV. 585, 591–92 (2015).
18
For scholarship examining this relationship, see LAURA BRIGGS, HOW ALL POLITICS
BECAME REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 64 (2017) (noting that domestic violence is the primary
cause of women’s poverty); Laura T. Kessler, PPI, Patriarchy, and the Schizophrenic View
of Women: A Feminist Analysis of Welfare Reform in Maryland, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 317, 375 n.12 (1995) (citing studies showing a direct correlation between domestic
violence and poverty); JODY RAPHAEL & RICHARD TOLMAN, TRAPPED BY POVERTY,
TRAPPED BY ABUSE: NEW EVIDENCE DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE (1997) (path-breaking study showing that domestic
violence prevents women from engaging in the workforce).
19
See Areas of Focus, OFFICE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ovw/areas-focus [https://perma.cc/J4JU-VD6C] (last visited July
17, 2019) (defining domestic violence as crimes of violence); see also Kristy Candela,
Protecting the Invisible Victim: Incorporating Coercive Control in Domestic Violence
Statutes, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 112, 117 (2016) (“There is an obvious fixation on physical
violence and criminal acts in domestic violence statutes.”).
20
See infra Part I.
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
See Economic Justice, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
https://nnedv.org/content/economic-justice/ [https://perma.cc/7BEZ-2BRB] (last visited
July 17, 2019) [hereinafter NNEDV]. The NNEDV is a national network that provides
technical assistance to the state and local domestic violence coalitions. Id. An internet search
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strategies identify the need to adopt a range of workplace supports.24 All to the good,
of course. However, these initiatives, perhaps because they are relatively new, are
imperfectly suited to accomplish their goals: to prevent domestic violence and
enhance economic security for victims of domestic violence. The primary
programmatic focus of these “economic justice initiatives” privileges personal
financial literacy as a means to repair consumer credit and assist victims with
banking and saving, presumptively to achieve economic independence. 25 These
strategies are based on a flawed premise of victim empowerment folklore within the
culture of self-help that disregards the structural dimensions of poverty and debt.
They ignore the neoliberal structure of the political economy that burdens victims
with the costs of their remediation through strategies that benefit financial markets.26
Abuser treatment programs designed to hold abusers accountable and support
victims, moreover, acknowledge that economic strain and unemployment are
demographic risk factors in domestic violence, but fail to address joblessness as a
means to mitigate the abuse.27
The failure to address the structural dimensions of economic abuse and related
financial issues is not confined to the judicial system and advocates.28 To be sure,
economic analyses have deepened our understanding of both the ways that
livelihood—or the lack of livelihood—contributes to impoverishment and
of domestic violence programs that have recently adopted “economic justice initiatives” as
a primary means of responding to domestic violence reveals too many entries to cite.
Financial abuse is a subset of economic abuse with a focus on the abusive partner’s control
of money and finances. See Postmus et al., supra note 7, at 7.
24
See Economic Justice Policy, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://nnedv.org/content/economic-justice-policy/ [https://perma.cc/P2LE-R9KZ] (last
visited July 22, 2019).
25
See id.; see also Highlighting Financial Empowerment & the Allstate Foundation
Annual Purple Purse Challenge, NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (July 19,
2017), https://nnedv.org/latest_update/purple-purse-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/XV9YV9NH]; Program Profile Economic Justice Project, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EVIDENCE
PROJECT, https://www.dvevidenceproject.org/focus-areas/services-to-victims/program-andpractice-reviews/program-profile-economic-justice-project/ [https://perma.cc/L633-4R5N]
(last visited Aug. 20, 2019); Sarah J. Shoener & Erika A. Sussman, Economic Ripple Effect
of IPV: Building Partnerships for Systemic Change, 18 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 83, 84
(2013) (noting the emphasis on financial literacy training as the focus on the domestic
violence movement’s work related to economic justice).
26
This is generally true in the realm of gender and international analysis. See
HANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GENDER 1 (Juanita Elias &
Adrienne Roberts eds., 2018).
27
See infra Part III.
28
This is true generally across advocacy and research fields. See Economic
Empowerment Is a Social Justice Issue, JANE DOE INC., http://www.janedoe.org/what_we_
do/economic_empowerment [https://perma.cc/63D9-S3KW] (last visited Jul. 22, 2019)
(noting 74% of Americans personally know someone who suffered abuse, but 75% do not
relate domestic violence with economic abuse).
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entrapment for victims and the manner in which economic instability acts as a
determinant in abusive behavior. But missing from academic narratives are politicaleconomic analyses by which to examine the means of remediating domestic
violence-related economic abuse.29
The recent attention to remediating economic abuse demonstrates the need to
introduce matters of political economy into law and advocacy strategies. Such a
framework provides a way to map how the state and the market respond to poverty
and economic insecurity associated with domestic violence.30 This Article provides
such analysis and considers how market forces have shaped and constrained legal
remedies and advocacy strategies that address economic abuse. It gives particular
attention to the experience of poor and working-class women who are most likely to
be victims of IPV and are also among the least likely to obtain meaningful relief
within the dominant paradigm of domestic violence advocacy.31 This Article
critically examines whether existing legal remedies and advocacy strategies
adequately engage an understanding of the political economy so that programmatic
“advances” do not further exacerbate the economic circumstances of struggling
survivors as well as abusive partners. Interventions designed to address the
economic consequences of domestic violence are best analyzed within the real-life
dynamics of families, households, and other economic relationships. That is, in
function—or not—of the shattered remains of the social contract laid eviscerated by
neoliberal austerities that “favor[] free-market solutions to economic problems.”32
Part I of this Article identifies the principal sources of law that acknowledge
the relationship between economic abuse and domestic violence and then analyzes
the efficacy of the legal response. It suggests that, notwithstanding the law’s
apparent recognition of the economic abuse, most legal responses to domestic
29

See id.
See Frank Pasquale, Capital’s Offense: Law’s Entrenchment of Inequality (On
Piketty, “Capital in the 21st Century”), BOUNDARY 2 (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.boundary2.org/2014/10/capitals-offense-laws-entrenchment-of-inequality/#_
ftnref21 [https://perma.cc/CBY2-DK3V] (explaining the use of the term “political
economy”); see also Anna Akbar, Teaching Penal Abolition, LAW & POL. ECON. (July 15,
2019), https://lpeblog.org/ [https://perma.cc/7FY9-5SDA] (discussing a political economy
framework has been used to examine a broad array of legal and social issues.).
31
It is difficult to define the parameters of poor and working class and these definitions
often turn on issues beyond income including education and cultural norms. However, it is
reasonable to acknowledge economic inequality as differentiating between the rich and poor
and that most working families fall on the side of the poor. See David Cole, Taxing the Poor,
N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 25, 26 (May 10, 2018); see also sources cited supra note 30.
32
Stephanie Lee Mudge, What Is Neoliberalism, 6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 703, 706
(2008) (quoting THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (J. L.
Campbell & O. K. Pedersen eds., 2001)). see also Kerry Rittich, Black Sites: Locating the
Family and Family Law in Development, 58 AMER. J. OF COMP. LAW 1023, 1028 (2010)
(arguing the need to link the family with the market as a way to reveal the interrelated
pressures).
30
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violence do not adequately address the problem: an instance in which the law fails
both to apply available remedies and to address structural issues.
Part II explores current policy and program strategies as the domestic violence
movement considers alternatives to criminal justice remedies. This part suggests that
although there is variation in the field of domestic violence advocacy, most programs
have embraced “a depoliticized view of economic issues” and have focused
narrowly on technical issues related to personal money management as a means to
address financial abuse.33 This part examines the shortcomings of the financial
literacy paradigm as a means to address economic abuse, arguing that such models
are both fundamentally flawed and regressive.34
Part III addresses political-economic concerns related to the programs and
interventions designed for abusive partners. It examines the ways in which the nearuniversal model of abuser treatment programs fails to engage the reality of abusers’
economic circumstances. It suggests that inadequate concern for the structural
context of economic abuse is an egregious omission affecting the outcome of such
programs.
Part IV provides an examination of emerging models that address economic
abuse in the context of neoliberal policies and unfettered market ideology. It also
reviews progressive initiatives that address the circumstances of perpetrators while
holding them accountable for their abusive acts. These initiatives suggest that
developing solutions within the interconnectedness of political economy and
domestic violence is possible. Without such solutions, remedies will remain elusive.
As Professors Rahman and Sitaraman have observed, “[a]s questions of economic
inequality have taken center stage in American politics, there has been a growing
interest among public law scholars in questions of power, institutional design,
inequality, and political economy.”35 These same interests should inform law and
advocacy responses to domestic violence-related issues. A political-economic
approach is required to understand the ways that current political and economic
33
See NICOLA SHARP-JEFFS, LONDON METRO. U., A REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND
POLICY ON FINANCIAL ABUSE WITHIN INTIMATE PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS 7 (2015),
http://repository.londonmet.ac.uk/1482/1/Review-of-Research-and-Policy-on-FinancialAbuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6YR-JLNK] (explaining that financial abuse is a subset of
economic abuse); Chris Arthur, Consumers or Critical Citizens? Financial Literacy
Education and Freedom, 3 CRITICAL EDUC. 1, 3 (2012). See generally Cynthia K. Sanders
et al., Economic Education for Battered Women: An Evaluation of Outcomes, 22 J. WOMEN
& SOC. WORK 240 (2007) (examining recent economic education programs that are intended
to improve financial literacy, financial choices, opportunities, and consequences for battered
women); Shoener & Sussman, supra note 25 (exploring the reciprocal relationship between
intimate partner violence which creates financial instability and the available economic legal
remedies).
34
See infra Part II.
35
K. Sabeel Rahman & Ganesh Sitaraman, The Second Republican Revival, LAW &
POL. ECON. (Apr. 30, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/04/30/the-second-republicanreviv/#more-665 [https://perma.cc/B6LK-QCY2].
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arrangements affect victims, as well as abusive partners, to thereby assess economic
justice strategies in relation to structural capitalist economic modalities.36 Advocacy
strategies must bridge the public and private dichotomy beyond what the antidomestic violence movement has already accomplished and more: to examine the
assumptions regarding market-driven strategies offered as remedies to repair the
damage from economic abuse. To do otherwise would consign those whose lives are
shattered by domestic violence to remedies more suited for those who possess
political and financial power than those who do not.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-RELATED ECONOMIC ABUSE AND THE LEGAL PROJECT
This Part examines the promises and the failures of the legal mechanisms
deployed to address domestic violence-related economic abuse. Research on legal
intervention has focused principally on the success—or lack thereof—of preventing
future physical violence. This research has paid little attention to the efficacy of the
law as a means to ameliorate the economic consequences of such abuse.37 This Part
does not address each means of legal intervention but rather seeks to identify the
principal legal sites where the issue emerges and, further, to describe and critique
how the law functions to address the problem. This Part examines the limitations of
the instrumentalities of the law and calls attention to the ways the law avoids or
complicates the problem within the context of a political-economic framework. That
is, the way each of the varied legal tools contributes to a privatization of the
consequences of domestic violence while concealing the contributing role of
structural inequality.
A substantial body of research addresses the forms of domestic violence-related
economic abuse.38 The prevailing approach to domestic violence, however, presents
principally as a “problem” of physical violence; and public attention focuses on this
form of abuse.39 Thus, this Part begins with a review of the research addressing the
means and consequences of economic abuse as context for the discussion regarding
federal and state legal remedies to follow thereafter.
A. The Economic Consequences of Domestic Violence & Economic Abuse
The physical and psychological consequences of IPV reach deeply to shatter
the sources of personal security, central to which is a woman’s ability to be fully
36
Amy Kapczynski, Law and the Political Economy of Technology, LAW & POL. ECON.
(May 30, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/05/30/law-and-the-political-economy-oftechnology/ [https://perma.cc/H5UA-ENGC].
37
See Melanie M. Hughes & Lisa D. Brush, The Price of Protection: A Trajectory
Analysis of Civil Remedies for Abuse and Women’s Earnings, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 140, 143
(2015) (observing that the research on legal intervention has focused on abuse per se but not
the effects of such intervention on economic outcomes).
38
See supra notes 10–12, 18.
39
Postmus et al., supra note 7, at 1.
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engaged and productive in the workplace. Physical injuries sideline victims and
compromise their mobility in all facets of their lives. Patterns are discernible and
include repeated practices men use to prevent women from meaningful engagement
in the workforce or to keep them from engaging in education or skills-gaining
programs.40 Jody Raphael’s ground-breaking work on the relationship between
domestic violence and poverty has described the harm inflicted by abusive partners
seeking to deny their victims economic agency.41 These tactics are well-documented
and include the infliction of physical abuse in visible places to humiliate or otherwise
impair a victim’s ability to engage in the outside world, to interfere with
transportation or childcare arrangements, and more.42 Social scientists studying this
phenomenon have defined economic abuse “as a deliberate pattern of control in
which individuals interfere with their partner’s ability to acquire, use, and maintain
economic resources.”43 In fact, women are often exposed to a heightened risk of the
most egregious forms of physical abuse precisely at the point at which they seek
economic independence through employment, education, and training.44
The four-year Congressional inquiry examining the economic consequences of
domestic violence, preliminary to the enactment of the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act, provides ample evidence demonstrating how domestic violence
contributes to the impoverishment of women.45 Congressional hearings and reports
substantiated domestic violence as a causal agent in reduced productivity in the
workplace resulting in cycles of unemployment or under-employment.46 Gender
violence leads to increased health care expenditures, resulting in additional
economic pressures.47 And at least as important, the legislative evidence
demonstrated that economic harm was an intended consequence resulting from
calculated efforts to obstruct a woman’s earning capacity, thereby denying her a
means of independent livelihood—agency, in a word.48
40

Jody Raphael, Welfare Reform: Prescription for Abuse? A Report on New Research
Studies Documenting the Relationship of Domestic Violence and Welfare, 19 LAW & POL’Y
123, 124 (1997); see also Judy L. Postmus et al., Understanding Economic Abuse in the Lives
of Survivors, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 411, 412 (2012).
41
Raphael, supra note 40, at 124.
42
Id.
43
Postmus et al., supra note 7, at 2.
44
Richard M. Tolman & Jody Raphael, A Review of Research on Welfare and Domestic
Violence, 56 J. SOC. ISSUES 655, 667 (2000).
45
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 34, and 42 U.S.C. (2012 & Supp.
2017)).
46
See Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly: Between
“The Truly National and the Truly Local,” 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1091 (2000) [hereinafter
Weissman, Gender-Based Violence] (citing Congressional hearings spanning a four-year
period).
47
Id.
48
Id.
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Although the terms financial abuse and economic abuse are often used
interchangeably, the former represents a particular subset of economic abuse.
Researchers who study the issue observe that “financial abuse focuses specifically
on individual money and finances.”49 Abusive partners might seek to prohibit a
victim’s access to information about finances, control all decisions with regard to
household economics and spending, misuse property, engage in identity theft, steal
property or money, incur debt through coercive or surreptitious means, or coerce a
victim to file a fraudulent or inaccurate joint tax return.50 Financial abuse may
decimate a woman’s financial well-being and result in psychological and physical
ailments as a result of ensuing stress and poverty.51 Debts incurred as a result of all
forms of economic abuse will affect a victim’s chances of purchasing or renting a
home and obtaining utilities, car and home insurance rates, and employability.52
These debts constitute one of the greatest obstacles to leaving an abusive
relationship.53 The inability to maintain an adequate economic standard of living
persists years after the abuse has ended.54 Indeed, for victims of domestic violence,
economic life may come to a standstill.

49

SHARP-JEFFS, supra note 33, at 8 (distinguishing abuse related to money and finances
and abuse related to economic resources include housing and transportation, employment
and education).
50
Id. at 8–13 (describing forms of financial abuse); Postmus et al., supra note 7, at 5;
see also Jamie Haar, Women’s Work: Economic Security in the Domestic Violence Context,
31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 471, 488 (2014).
51
SHARP-JEFFS, supra note 33, at 16.
52
See Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit
Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 423 (2013) [hereinafter
Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit]; CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUSTICE, GUIDEBOOK
ON CONSUMER & ECONOMIC LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR SURVIVORS 21 (2017),
https://csaj.org/document-library/CSAJ_Guidebook_COMPLETE.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2
TQ-Y75U].
53
Economic abuse is found to be a key mechanism by which men maintain “coercive
control” over the victim. See EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: HOW MEN ENTRAP WOMEN
IN PERSONAL LIFE 276 (2007).
54
Postmus et al., supra note 7, at 2.
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B. Legal Responses to Economic Abuse at the Federal Level
1. The Violence Against Women Act
The passage of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)55 ratified a
federal recognition of the relationship between gender-based violence and women’s
equality and economy. Gender-based violence was acknowledged as a national
problem with economic consequences and civil rights implications.56 The statute
authorized funds for a variety of services to assist victims, including shelters and
hotlines, training for judges, and criminal justice remedies.57 As stated above,
Congress enacted the statute after four years of hearings to ascertain the impact of
domestic violence on the national economy and victims’ economic impairment.58
Despite this focus, an analysis of the developments and consequences of VAWA
demonstrate the law’s deficiencies at addressing the economic consequences of
domestic violence.
(a) VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy: Economic Damages
Congressional findings determined that the economic consequences of genderbased violence were pervasive and pernicious, deliberate and destructive, and
demanded a federal remedy justified under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.59 Based on the compelling evidence of economic consequences of
abuse, together with findings on the failure of state criminal justice systems to
address gender violence, Congress passed a civil rights remedy as a centerpiece of
VAWA.60 The legislative history demonstrates that the impact of gender-based
violence on interstate commerce and upon victims’ economic circumstances
motivated legislators to focus on a strategy to ground the need for an economical
remedy and supplement state laws.61 As one scholar, who assisted in the drafting

55

Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 34, and 42 U.S.C. (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
56
See Weissman, Gender-Based Violence, supra note 46, at 1087–89.
57
For a detailed overview of the provisions of VAWA, see Weissman, Gender-Based
Violence, supra note 46, at 1088–99.
58
See Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112–13 (2000). See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence,
Relationship, and Equality Meet: The Violence Against Women Act’s Civil Rights Remedy,
11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1996) (detailing the legislative history of the act).
59
See H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839, 1853; see also S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 29 (1993). The Commerce Clause
is found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
60
See Weissman, Gender-Based Violence, supra note 46, at 1081–83.
61
Nourse, supra note 58, at 18–23.
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and enactment of VAWA, explained, “the subject of VAWA’s civil rights remedy
should properly be regarded as economic.”62
VAWA’s proposed statutory remedy, based on the economic consequences of
IPV, served to raise the matter of gender violence to the level of national concern.
And more, as a litigation tool, it created a cause of action with the potential to enable
a successful plaintiff to obtain compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and
declaratory relief, and attorney fees—all remedies designed to restore economic
wellbeing and recover the losses occasioned by the violations suffered.63 The
remedy, however, was short-lived. In United States v. Morrison,64 by a five to four
vote, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the civil rights provision of VAWA,
characterizing gender-based violence as a noneconomic and noncommercial activity
to which the Commerce Clause could not apply.65
Much has been written about United States v. Morrison and the jurisprudential
questions it raised concerning economic activity and the reach of the Commerce
Clause.66 For purposes of remedying domestic violence, perhaps of greatest concern
was the Court’s unwillingness to consider domestic violence as a matter of economic
gravity with rights-based consequences appropriate for adjudication by federal
courts. The majority failed to consider the Congressional findings that gender-based
violence did indeed impact the national economy and, moreover, that the violent acts
were themselves often specifically economic and designed to prevent a woman’s
financial independence.67 The Court’s unwillingness to accord judicial deference to
62
Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the Use
and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 147 n.515 (2002); see also Judith Resnik,
Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 633–34
(2001).
63
See Violence Against Women Act of 1994 §§ 40302–40303, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1902, 1941, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), 34 U.S.C. § 12361(c) (Supp. 2017) (original
version at 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), 13981(c) (1994)), invalidated by United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
64
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
65
Id. at 609–613, 627. The Court also rejected Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a basis of support for the Act aimed at remedying the failure of state criminal justice
systems. Id. at 615.
66
See, e.g., Weissman, Gender-Based Violence, supra note 46; Julie Goldscheid, The
Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not Ruled
Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157 (2005); Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the
Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000); Goldfarb, supra note 62; Victoria Nourse,
Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000);
Lawrence G. Sager, A Letter to the Supreme Court Regarding the Missing Argument in
Brzonkala v. Morrison, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150 (2000); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
67
See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614–17; see also Domestic Violence: Not Just a Family
Matter: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 25 (1994); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System:
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the legislative findings displayed its inhospitable attitude to remedying the economic
consequences of gender violence.68
(b) Beyond Morrison: VAWA’s Civil Rights Remedy’s Structural
Deficiencies
Scholars and activists alike critiqued the decision in Morrison, yet a closer look
at the Act reveals that VAWA promised limited value as a civil rights remedy to
domestic violence. The civil rights action authorized suits against individuals, not
institutions.69 Professor Julie Goldscheid has described the difficulties with these
limitations: “civil rights claims against individuals may be less advantageous
because individuals generally can support less generous financial awards than can
institutions.”70 Moreover, she observes that VAWA’s civil rights remedies “contain
an inherent class bias.”71 Specifically, VAWA privileged those whose abusers had
sufficient wealth (from whom a recovery might have been possible), thus
discouraging those victims whose abusers lacked income or assets.72 Thus, under
VAWA, attorneys were unlikely to accept a VAWA civil rights claim on a
contingency fee basis where recovery was unlikely. Poor women, unable to obtain
counsel from federally funded Legal Aid programs whose attorneys are prohibited
from accepting fee-generating cases, were particularly encumbered by lack of
resources and therefore unlikely to utilize VAWA’s remedy.73

Hearing Before the Senate. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 241 (1991); Hearing on
Domestic Violence: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 27.
(1993); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 37 (1990).
68
Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (“[T]he existence of congressional findings is
not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.”),
with Walter v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330 n.12 (1985) (noting
that “[w]hen Congress makes findings on essentially factual issues . . . those findings are of
course entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an institution better
equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on such an issue”).
69
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 §§ 40302–40303, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1902, 1941, 34 U.S.C. § 12361(c) (Supp. 2017) (original version at 42 U.S.C. §
13981(c) (1994)), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
70
Julie Goldscheid, Elusive Equality in Domestic and Sexual Violence Law Reform, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 768 (2007) [hereinafter Goldscheid, Elusive Equality]; see also
Lisset M. Pino, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: The Feminist Case Against Individual Adjudication, 30
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 401, 404 (2018) (arguing that individualized adjudication hinders the
ability to identify and evaluate claims of widespread discrimination).
71
Goldscheid, Elusive Equality, supra note 70, at 768–69.
72
See id.
73
See 45 C.F.R. § 1609.3 (2017); James P. George, Access to Justice, Costs, and Legal
Aid, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 293, 313 (2006).
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Income inequality and racism often decisively determined the degree to which
VAWA’s civil rights remedy served to provide relief.74 As a general matter, in
addition to lacking resources to afford counsel, women who are not fully proficient
in English and who have suffered discrimination within the legal system are often
excluded from access to legal remedies.75 With regard to VAWA, as Professor Sally
Goldfarb has written:
questions remain about the usefulness of the civil rights provision to poor
women and women of color, in light of underlying obstacles like racial
and ethnic bias in the legal system, inadequate access to counsel, and the
inability of some perpetrators to pay damages because of their lack of
assets.76
Indeed, an economy that acts to privilege access to market-driven legal services
cannot plausibly be a sufficient means to obtain relief from domestic violence.
(c) VAWA as a Funding Statute: The Failure to Purchase Remedy
It is true that the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 offered more than a
failed civil rights remedy. In all other regards, VAWA, which has largely operated
as a funding stream for programs and services, has been reauthorized by Congress
in 2000, 2005, and 2013, and was again proposed for renewal in 2018.77 But the
legislation has failed to address adequately the economic consequences of domestic
violence or offer a sufficient economic remedy to victims. VAWA was originally
enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act and part

74

See Sally F. Goldfarb, Viewing the Violence Against Women Act Through the Lenses
of Feminist Legal Theory, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 198, 203 (2010) [hereinafter Goldfarb,
Viewing the Violence]; Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction
of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463,
491 (1996) (noting that the “civil rights provision provides little practical relief from the
complex multiple experiences of sexism, and race, ethnic and culture-based discrimination
endemic to the lives of women of color”).
75
Rivera, supra note 74, at 498.
76
See Goldfarb, Viewing the Violence, supra note 74, at 203.
77
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386 §§
1101–1513, 114 Stat. 1464, 1491–1537; Violence Against Women and Department of
Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960; Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 34, and 42 U.S.C. (2012 & Supp. 2017)); Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act 2018, H.R. 6545, 115th Cong. 2d Sess. (2018). At the
time of this writing, it is currently up for reauthorization. See Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2019, H.R. 1585, 116th Cong. (2019) (as placed on Senate calendar,
Apr. 10, 2019).
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of an Omnibus Crime bill (the most sweeping crime bill in U.S. history).78 The Act
focused principally on increasing and enhancing options for criminal prosecution.79
To be sure, VAWA enacted much needed legal changes. In the realm of
funding, it has included provisions mandating services by VAWA-funded recipients
in exchange for receipt of federal dollars, including some funding for emergency
and transitional housing support for qualifying victims.80 But the allocations are
insufficient, and those most affected by Congressional inattention to the economic
needs of victims tend to be poor women who are seeking transitional second stage
housing omitted from VAWA’s funding scheme.81 Moreover, housing assistance
and safeguards apply only to those who demonstrate that they meet VAWA’s narrow
crime-related definition and reside in certain federally-funded units; but VAWA
does not apply such protections or safeguards to or otherwise encumber private
housing markets.82
VAWA funds tended to award money to established domestic violence
programs that historically failed to consider the needs of poor women, women of
color, and immigrant women.83 Through each successive reauthorization,
Congressional funding has increased to police, prosecutors, and prisons at the
expense of programs and services that otherwise might have assisted victims with

78

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 31, 34, and 42 U.S.C. (2012 &
Supp. 2017)).
79
Subsequent reauthorizations expanded criminal justice tools that some described as
“draconian.” Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carceral State: The Future of Penal Policy
Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1693, 1721 (2006). Others have described it as a “stunning
extension of state power.” Dorothy Roberts, Collateral Consequences, Genetic Surveillance,
and the New Biopolitics of Race, 54 HOW. L.J. 567, 571–72 (2011).
80
For a list of all grants administered by the Office of Violence Against Women
pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act, see OVW Grants and Programs, U.S. DEP. OF
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ovw/grant-programs [https://perma.cc/BCC9-NP86] (last
updated Feb. 5, 2019).
81
Alyse Faye Haugen, When It Rains, It Pours: The Violence Against Women Act’s
Failure to Provide Shelter from the Storm of Domestic Violence, 14 SCHOLAR 1035, 1057–
58 (2012).
82
34 U.S.C. § 12291 (2012); NAT’L. HOUSING L. PROJECT, VAWA 2013 CONTINUES
VITAL HOUSING PROTECTIONS FOR SURVIVORS AND PROVIDES NEW SAFEGUARDS (Jan.
2014),
http://nhlp.org/files/VAWA-2013-Bulletin-Article-Jan-2014-updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RQ9Q-8BFG]. The prototype crime-related definition controls, despite the
research that finds that victims are more likely to suffer non-physical abuse, in the form of
economic or social abuse, than physical abuse. See, e.g., Maureen Outlaw, No One Type of
Intimate Partner Abuse: Exploring Physical and Non-Physical Abuse Among Intimate
Partners, 24 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 263, 266 (2009).
83
See Rivera, supra note 74, at 507–09 (noting that VAWA’s funding scheme resulted
in few anti-violence programs that are interested and capable of working with communities
of color).
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transformative economic recovery. 84 The criminal justice system has benefitted from
VAWA’s funding stream more than any other type of domestic violence-related
intervention.85 Moreover, since its initial enactment, already limited Congressional
allocations for economic assistance have been either reduced or appropriated at
lesser amounts than budgeted.86 Indeed, studies show that current federal
appropriations to mitigate domestic violence have failed to adequately appropriate
funds for services, resulting in the lack of victim access to childcare, legal services,
and public transportation.87 Lack of funding resulted in approximately 12,000 unmet
requests from victims in one single day, the majority of whom were seeking
assistance for safe housing.88

84

Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic
Rights, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 188 (2003) (noting that most domestic violence
funding is allocated to criminal intervention); see also The Continued Importance of the
Violence Against Women Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
2 (2009) (opening statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy); Caroline Bettinger-Lopez et al.,
VAWA Is Not Enough: Academics Speak Out About VAWA, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (Feb.
27, 2012), http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2012/02/academics-speak-about-vawareauthorization/ [https://perma.cc/9P8F-GC65] (noting that VAWA’s 2012 allocation
supplied criminal justice strategies with more than double the funds than allocated to civil
legal assistance, housing, and training for family court judges combined); Rickke Mananzala
et al., Law Reform and Transformative Change: A Panel at CUNY Law, 14 CUNY L. REV.
21, 41 (2010) (critiquing the Act’s funding formula as disproportionately allocated to
criminal intervention).
85
See Leigh Goodmark, The Violence Against Women Act Is Unlikely to Deter
Domestic Violence — Here’s Why, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Oct. 23, 2018 10:45 AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-10-23/violence-against-women-act-unlikely-deterdomestic-violence-heres-why [https://perma.cc/BAB4-JGUH].
86
See Charlene K. Baker et al., A Descriptive Analysis of Transitional Housing
Programs for Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence in the United States, 15 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 460, 463 (2009) (noting lesser appropriations for housing than what had
been authorized); Bettinger-Lopez et al., supra note 84 (noting the $11 million reduction in
housing aid in VAWA 2013, and no consideration of emergency financial assistance or
meaningful job assistance).
87
NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
FY
19
FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS
REQUESTS
(July
2019),
https://dev.nnedv.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Library_Public_Policy_Appropriations
Requests.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2NL-2TAV].
88
Id. at 2.
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2. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act
The enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and
Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”)89 in 1996 was designed to limit dependency on
welfare and transform the way in which the federal government provided for poor
families.90 PRWORA ended the historic Aid to Families of Dependent Children
(“AFDC”) entitlement program,91 which had been in place since 1935, and replaced
it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”). 92 PRWORA set forth
new, stringent qualifications to qualify for TANF benefits, which were henceforth
limited to five years, and required recipients to engage in work activities to maintain
benefits.93 PRWORA failed to address the impact of the restrictions on women
whose reliance on public benefits was a result of IPV.94 Congress, however, created
an opportunity for victims of domestic violence to opt out of certain statutory
requirements created by PRWORA through an amendment, known as the Family
Violence Option, which was designed to ease the economic circumstances of poor
victims of domestic violence.95
(a) The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation
Act and the Family Violence Option
Congressional findings during PRWORA’s legislative process acknowledged
that the great majority of welfare recipients—as many as three quarters—were
89

See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–610, 612–
13, 615–17 (2012)).
90
Id.
91
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program was originally entitled Aid
to Dependent Children. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §
104(a)(2), 76 Stat. 173, 185 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602).
92
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. at 2112–2155; CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES,
POLICY BASICS: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES 1 (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJT
5-TJ28].
93
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–610, 612–
13, 615–17 (2012)); see also Amy E. Hirsch, Welfare Reform and Women with Felony Drug
Convictions: Research Results and Policy Recommendations, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587
(2000) (noting that the Act also imposed a lifetime ban on welfare for those convicted of
drug felonies or who had violated probation or parole).
94
See generally Maria L. Imperial, Self-Sufficiency and Safety: Welfare Reform for
Victims of Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 3 (1997) (reviewing how
funding restrictions may prevent victims from accessing basic subsistence to allow them to
leave abuse relationships).
95
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 260.50 et seq (2018).
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victims of domestic abuse that interfered with their ability to obtain or maintain
employment.96 Studies have documented the importance of welfare benefits for
domestic violence victims, many of whom have relied on public support as a
temporary safety net to secure at least a bare minimum level of economic autonomy
to enable them to flee abusive relationships.97 These studies justified an amendment
to PRWORA to address the impact of new welfare regulations on victims of
domestic violence.98 Known as the Wellstone-Murray Family Violence Option
(“FVO”), the amendment permits, but does not mandate, state-by-state exemptions
for domestic violence victims to receive benefits notwithstanding TANF’s time
limits and work requirements.99
(b) Assessing the Family Violence Option
The prevailing consensus of empirical studies is that the FVO, even where
adopted by the states, has provided little economic relief to victims of domestic
violence.100 The amendment lacks requirements or standards with regard to its
96

See Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110–12; see also Brief for SixtySix Organizations Serving Domestic Violence Survivors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Anderson v. Roe, 524 U.S. 982 (1998) (No. 98-97), 1998 WL 847246, at 11–
3.
97
MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 355 (1988); Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal
Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 369, 388 (1998); Raphael, supra note 40, at 125; see also Jody Raphael,
Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory of Welfare
Dependency, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 201 (1996); Symposium, A Leadership Summit: The
Link Between Violence and Poverty in the Lives of Women and Their Children, 3 GEO. J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 5, 8 (1995); Stacy Brustin & Lisa Vollendorf Martin, Paved with Good
Intentions: Unintended Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child Support and
Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803, 837 (2015).
98
42 U.S.C. § 602 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C) (2012) (listing the situations that
constitute when a person has been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty,” including when
a person has been subjected to acts of physical and sexual abuse, mental abuse, and denial
of medical care).
99
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012). States wishing to implement the FVO would
be required to screen TANF applicants for domestic violence to determine eligibility for time
limit and work requirement waivers, refer to counseling, and waive cooperation requirements
that required welfare recipients to assist the state in locating the non-custodial parent in order
to oblige him to reimburse the state for TANF payments. For a discussion of the challenges
of these child support enforcement cooperation requirements, see Deborah M. Weissman,
Countering Neoliberalism and Aligning Solidarities: Rethinking Domestic Violence
Advocacy, 45 SW. L. REV. 915, 931–934 (2016).
100
E.g., TIMOTHY CASEY ET AL., NOT ENOUGH: WHAT TANF OFFERS FAMILY
VIOLENCE VICTIMS, LEGAL MOMENTUM & NAT’L RESOURCE CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
17–18 (2010), https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-08/NotEnoughTAN
F-FVFULLReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/97NN-6LQQ]; Rachel J. Gallagher, Welfare
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implementation. Welfare program caseworkers, in most cases, fail to screen TANF
applicants and often withhold information about applicants’ right to seek waivers
from TANF requirements or otherwise obtain domestic violence referrals and
services.101 Caseworkers are reluctant to grant FVO waivers of work and do not
extend the time period within which victims are eligible to receive benefits.102 In
some localities, the data shows that caseworkers have granted an extremely low
number of waivers.103 Moreover, the FVO does not recognize economic abuse as a
circumstance related to domestic violence, thus raising additional questions as to the
usefulness of the amendment.104
As a result of the failures of the FVO, domestic violence victims are expelled
from welfare rolls and forced to accept low-wage, dead-end jobs without state
support.105 Promised job placement and training programs, touted as benefits of the
Act, often never materialize.106 The jobs that are available to domestic violence
victims who are no longer eligible for welfare are of limited value in these victims’
efforts to achieve economic stability.107 Victims cannot use TANF funds for
postsecondary education; and TANF instead prescribes “immediate paid
employment, rather than promoting higher post-welfare wages and the possibility of

Reform’s Inadequate Implementation of the Family Violence Option: Exploring the Dual
Oppression of Poor Domestic Violence Victims, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 987,
1003–04 (2011).
101
Gallagher, supra note 100, at 1007.
102
See Laurie Pompa, The Family Violence Option in Texas: Why Is It Failing to Aid
Domestic Violence Victims on Welfare and What to Do About It, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
241, 251 (2007).
103
Id. at 250 (providing data that out of 175,126 TANF applicants, Texas only granted
190 domestic violence waivers).
104
42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii) (2012); see also Margaret E. Johnson, Changing
Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: From Safety to Security, 60 VILL.
L. REV. 145, 193 (2015) (explaining that, notwithstanding TANF’s broad definition of
domestic violence to include battery and extreme cruelty, case workers have narrowly
interpreted domestic violence, privileging acts of physical violence).
105
See Kevin J. Miller, Welfare and the Minimum Wage: Are Workfare Participants
“Employees” Under the Fair Labor Standards Act?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 207 (1999)
(noting that TANF workfare participants are not guaranteed minimum wage, as the program
focuses on participation rates rather than successful job placements).
106
Why It’s So Hard to Get Off Welfare (PBS radio broadcast Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/hard-get-welfare [https://perma.cc/RPZ7-XML9]; Joel
Handler, Reforming/Deforming Welfare, 4 NEW LEFT REV. 114, 124 (2000).
107
KATHRYN EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING IN
AMERICA 61 (2015); Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty
and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 40 (2014).
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long-term self-sufficiency.”108 Michele Gilman has observed that former welfare
recipients often find work in low-wage jobs with few benefits.109
In sum, the FVO, enacted to provide some measure of financial protection for
victims of domestic violence, has had little or no mitigating effect on the economic
impact of domestic abuse or the consequences of PRWORA. The timing of the
PRWORA’s enactment—merely two years after VAWA—suggests a type of
legislative amnesia. As stated above, four years of VAWA hearings disclosed an
abundance of evidence about the economic consequences of domestic violence.110
Yet, both TANF sanctions and the empty promises of the FVO have imperiled
victims, exposing them to the risks of hunger, homelessness, and unmet medical
needs, and increasing the likelihood that they will return to abusive relationships for
lack of a safety net.111
(c) The Political Economy of the Welfare State: Domestic Violence in
Context
The FVO must be assessed for more than its ability, or lack thereof, to alleviate
the consequences of domestic violence. Specifically, it must also be evaluated within
the political-economic framework of the United States, which has long been
considered a “welfare laggard” for its comparatively weak support for and lack of
universal social programs.112 The U.S. welfare model relies primarily on market
factors, prized as the optimal regulatory mechanism for the distribution of goods and
services, and secondarily on kinship systems, community ties, and private
charities.113 Statutory requirements regarding welfare eligibility derive from and

108

Janice Y. Law, Changing Welfare “As We Know It” One More Time: Assuring Basic
Skills and Postsecondary Education Access for TANF Recipients, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
243, 253 (2008).
109
Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward A CommunityBased Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 742 (2005).
110
See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
111
Vicki Lens, Work Sanctions Under Welfare Reform: Are They Helping Women
Achieve Self-Sufficiency?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 255, 263–64 (2006).
112
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE SHADOW WELFARE STATE 1 (2000).
113
SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 123 (1989) (arguing that
system is premised upon kinship systems); see also Anthony Giddens & Will Hutton, In
Conversation, in GLOBAL CAPITALISM 44 (Will Hutton & Anthony Giddens eds., 2000)
(noting that markets are considered superior in all regards compared to government and that
markets foreclose the need for social justice programs).
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reinforce the dominant economic and political ideologies,114 and thus produce
minimalist benefits that are targeted to the fewest eligible recipients.115
PRWORA and the FVO reflect the current punitive political-economic view of
personal responsibility—one that does not provide much by way of cushion for
victims of gender violence who lack the means to resume their lives without
assistance.116 PRWORA and the failed FVO reflect the prevalent ideology that the
state has little responsibility for the economic wellbeing of its citizens, even when
an act so universally decried as domestic violence befalls them. For victims of
domestic violence, whose participation in the labor force is often hindered by the
experiences of abuse, dependency on the market for economic sustenance in the
form of wages and healthcare cannot provide sufficient opportunities for “economic
citizenship.”117 These enactments ignore the economic lives of domestic violence
victims. Additionally, the erosion of private-sector welfare provisions, including
pensions and health insurance, have adversely affected individuals with steady
employment histories who now seek government assistance to make ends meet.118 It
will take more than an effective FVO to provide economic assistance to domestic
violence victims to bring these concerns within the law and legal policy. Rather, it
will take a humanist vision that transforms the political climate and considers “the
relationship between economic inequality and the lives people are actually able to
lead.”119
3. The Internal Revenue Code
The Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) affects all aspects of the national
economy, including the economy of households that often constitute the family unit
114

Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the
Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 807–08 (2003) (stating that
neoliberalism has used the seemingly technical economic tool of “moral hazard” to
reposition AFDC from social virtue to social vice).
115
ROBERT E. GOODIN ET AL., THE REAL WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 44–45,
240–41 (1999) (noting that transfer payments have been so low that the “undeserving” poor
receive amounts considered punitive); see also David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy,
Inequality Rediscovered, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 61, 63 (2017) (noting that answers
to questions about inequality “lie in the laws that constitute various economic orders”).
116
JAMES A. TYNER, VIOLENCE IN CAPITALISM: DEVALUING LIFE IN AN AGE OF
RESPONSIBILITY 122 (2016) (suggesting that the Act served to punish welfare recipients for
their plight).
117
ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST
FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 12 (2001) (defining economic
citizenship).
118
TYNER, supra note 116, at 124 (noting that although the Act promised to move
people from welfare to work, most recipients were already employed, sometimes at two jobs
but needing additional support to make ends meet).
119
Grewal & Purdy, supra note 115, at 63.
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of tax policy.120 Tax laws have particular consequences for spouses who file joint
tax returns. Joint filing tends to be the most economically beneficial filing status,
whereby each spouse will be jointly and severally liable for each other’s income
taxes.121 However, a joint filing spouse who is a victim of domestic violence, and
who is denied control of family finances, often faces potential liability for income
tax payments and penalties due to the wrongdoing of the abusive spouse.122
Similarly, both marital status and abuse complicate eligibility for tax benefits under
the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”).123
A variety of I.R.C. mechanisms address these issues.
(a) Income Tax Liability and Relief for Victims of Domestic Violence
Almost a half-century ago, Congress recognized the need to create an exception
to the joint liability framework in the I.R.C., having determined that “[n]umerous
cases have arisen in which the imposition of joint liability upon an innocent spouse
has resulted . . . in grave injustice.”124 Over the years that Congress has reconsidered
and revised the joint liability exception, it has identified domestic violence as an
issue relevant to avoiding tax injustice.125
Coerced fillings of joint tax returns serve as an effective means of economic
abuse.126 For a victim of domestic violence, potential tax liabilities arising from
fraudulent or inaccurate income tax returns may result in long-lasting consequences
that compromise her ability to gain control of her economic life, already made
difficult by the abuse she has suffered. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) is
authorized to assess liability for a tax debt and penalties for up to ten years after
returns were filed and collect against either or both spouses for the years the couple
was married.127 A tax liability of this sort may be due to the abuser’s financial
120

Tessa R. Davis, Mapping the Families of the Internal Revenue Code, 22 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 179, 182 (2014).
121
See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012); see also Richard C.E. Beck, The Failure of Innocent
Spouse Reform, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 929, 930 (2007) (describing the history of the joint
return liability requirement); Robert W. Wood, IRS Tougher On “Innocent” Spouse Relief,
FORBES (Oct. 18, 2010, 9:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2010/10/18/
irs-tougher-on-innocent-spouse-relief/#36035017bc4d
[https://perma.cc/6PHP-3B3B]
(noting that only 5% of spouses file separate tax returns).
122
See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012) (stating that “if a joint return is made, . . . the liability
with respect to the tax shall be joint and several”).
123
See infra Section I.B.3.c.
124
S. Rep. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6089, 6090.
125
See I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (2012) (enumerating ways to obtain relief from joint and
several liability on a joint tax return including relief for individuals who made an election
with “actual knowledge” if the “individual with actual knowledge establishes that such
individual signed the return under duress.”).
126
See Haar, supra note 50, at 491.
127
See I.R.C. §6013(d)(3) (2012) (stating that “if a joint return is made, . . . the liability
with respect to the tax shall be joint and several”); I.R.C. § 6502(a) (2012).
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dealings for which she lacked knowledge, consent, or control.128 Moreover, it is
unlikely that a victim of financial abuse would receive or benefit from any refund
that might be due. In sum, tax filing is an issue that falls squarely within the
parameters of domestic violence-related economic abuse.129
In addition to the claim that an abused tax filer signed a return under duress,130
which would obviate the “joint” nature of such return, the I.R.C. sets out three types
of relief from joint and several liability that bear on the circumstances of domestic
violence victims. The first is “innocent spouse relief” that provides relief from any
additional tax owed based on a spouse or former spouse’s failure to report income,
report income improperly, or claim proper deductions or credits.131 The second
category, known as “separation of liability relief,” allows the IRS to allocate
separately any additional tax owed between former spouses or current spouses when
the parties are legally separated or not living together when a taxable item was not
reported properly on a joint return.132 Finally, the IRS may allow “equitable relief”
when no other relief is available, and the income tax liability from which a spouse
seeks relief is attributable to the other spouse.133 As Professor Jamie Haar has
explained, given the dynamics of domestic violence, and in particular economic
abuse, a victim may not learn of a problem with a joint tax filing in a timely manner,
128

See Jennifer Sarkees, Phase Three of New York State Domestic Violence Law: The
Financial Aftermath, 14 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 95, 114–15 (2005) (explaining that “if the
abusive spouse merely files a joint tax return where a tax liability exists, he may have,
deliberately or inadvertently, made the victim liable for the debt”); see also Jacqueline
Clarke, (In)equitable Relief: How Judicial Misconceptions About Domestic Violence Prevent
Victims from Attaining Innocent Spouse Relief Under I.R.C. Sec. S 6015(F), 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 825, 827 (2014) (“[A]n ‘innocent spouse’ will be liable for tax
deficiencies belonging to her spouse, even if she had no knowledge of the liabilities or knew
of the liabilities but feared to confront her spouse with them, as is quite common within the
domestic violence context.”).
129
See Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105, 137 (1943) (“The power to tax is the
power to destroy only in the sense that those who have power can misuse it.”) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
130
Duress is not defined in the I.R.C. In the context of tax relief, it is a lesser standard
than abuse relating to factors at the time of signing the return that demonstrate that claimant
involuntarily executed the return and thus, the return is not considered a joint return. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6013–4 (2002); see also Nihiser v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531 (2008), 2008
WL 2120983 at *8. This relief is not as comprehensive as equitable relief provided for an
abused spouse, as the return will be treated as a single filing. For an overview of tax cases
dealing with this concept, see Melvyn B. Frumkes, Duress Diverts Dual Tax Liability for
Joint Returns, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1, 16 (2004).
131
Topic No. 205 Innocent Spouse Relief (Including Separation of Liability and
Equitable Relief), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc205
[https://perma.cc/9445-G4KA] (last visited July 21, 2019).
132
Id. The spouse seeking relief is still responsible for the remaining tax otherwise
allocated to her. Id.
133
Id.
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and thus may be precluded from seeking “innocent spouse” or “separation of liability
relief,” both of which the victim must seek within two years of the tax filing.134 Thus,
a request for equitable relief with more lenient standards is most likely to have the
greatest relevance to victims of domestic violence.135
(b) Assessing the Usefulness of I.R.S. Income Tax Relief
Victims of domestic violence must follow IRS procedures to obtain relief and
prove a number of factors related to marital status, lack of knowledge or control
related to the underpayment or understated income, their own tax compliance
histories, economic hardship, and proof of abuse.136 The required IRS form used to
seek tax relief is confusing and complicated, particularly for those without tax and
other legal guidance. It sets out an initial advisory on the first page, informing the
victim that her abusive spouse will be notified of her claim, which if successful, may
cause him to bear additional tax burdens.137 This advisory is repeated and
emphasized (“there are no exceptions to this rule”) in the section related to domestic
violence claims, amid ambiguous references to certain information that might be
considered confidential.138 Tax experts advise that if a tax claimant does proceed to
timely file a properly completed, lengthy, and detailed form, her chances of
obtaining relief from the IRS are underwhelming.139
The tax code provisions that might assist victims of domestic violence have not
been easily deciphered by the courts. As one U.S. Tax Court stated, “[t]his is not a
terribly well-developed corner of tax law, and it is not one in which we can really
get much help by looking at detailed regulations or the ordinary canons of
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Haar, supra note 50, at 492.
Id.
136
Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43 I.R.B. 397 (2013). For a useful overview of the revenue
procedure guidelines based on an empirical study, see Clarke, supra note 128, at 825, 829–
31.
137
IRS, FORM 8857 REQUEST FOR INNOCENT SPOUSE REQUEST (Jan. 2014)
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8857.pdf [https://perma.cc/LTM6-KNZR] (“Important
things you should know” . . . “The IRS is required by law to notify the person on line 5 that
you requested this relief.”).
138
Id. at 6–7; see also Frances D. Sheehy & Anthony J. Scaletta, The Continuing
Evolution of the “New” Innocent Spouse Rules as Implemented and Interpreted by the
Internal Revenue Service and the Courts Part II, 76 FLA. B.J. 53, 56 (2002) (noting that the
right to notice and intervention “allow[s] abusive spouses one more chance to intimidate the
truly innocent spouse”). This does not suggest that an abusive spouse is not entitled to notice
given the possibility of additional tax liability, but the request may create additional danger
for an abused person.
139
See Wood, supra note 121 (observing “the innocence label is not easy to get”); David
Klasing, When Can a Taxpayer Qualify for Innocent Tax Relief?, KLASING ASSOCIATES
(June 27, 2017), https://klasing-associates.com/question/innocent-spouse-relief-qualified/
[https://perma.cc/6WZZ-J2W8].
135
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construction.”140 Although this type of relief is one of the most frequently litigated
issues in the realm of the tax code, the IRS has provided little guidance to the
courts.141 Although tax courts may have improved from a time when a tax judge
referred to domestic violence as “distasteful[] acts”;142 a review of tax court
decisions reveals that these courts fail to contextualize the history of domestic
violence, and thus misapply standards relating to abuse and duress that bear on a
victim’s request for relief.143 Tax courts adjudicating claims for equitable relief
provisions rarely have sufficient experience with the dynamics of domestic
violence.144 The analyses of tax court cases where claimants alleged domestic
violence as the basis for tax relief reveal that outcomes are often confusing and
demonstrate that tax courts are more likely to deny relief than grant it.145
Statutory factors favor a claimant who is separated or divorced when seeking
relief, thus disadvantaging victims who remain married to their abusers because of
physical threats as well as economic barriers to separation.146 On the other hand,
where victims are separated at the time of filing, judges fail to recognize that
separation does not always end abuse and, in fact, attempts to exit an abusive
relationship may exacerbate the danger of violence.147 Thus, tax courts often deny
relief on the basis that a victim “could not be abused at the time of signing.”148 Some
courts assign little or no weight to police records documenting domestic violence
where the victim does not proceed with criminal charges and otherwise exact an
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See Nihiser v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531 (2008), 2008 WL 2120983 at *10.
See Wei-Chih Chiang et al., New Rules for Innocent Spouse Equitable Relief, J.
ACCOUNTANCY (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2014/may/
innocent-spouse-relief-20139090.html [https://perma.cc/92XK-52WP]. Clarke, supra note
128, at 846.
142
Estate of Merlin H. Ayesworth v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 134, 145–46 (1955).
143
Clarke, supra note 128, at 844–45, 853, 856 (examining tax court cases that reveal
judge’s use of stereotypes and reliance on misconceptions about domestic violence); see,
e.g., Sotuyo v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2012-27, at 5 (2012); Ladehoff v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2012-15, at 3 (2012).
144
Clarke, supra note 128, at 856.
145
Id. at 845–47 (noting a decline in the number of cases where relief for abused victims
was granted).
146
See id. at 838, 840–41 (reviewing cases where cultural reasons that prevented a
divorce, as well as lack of financial means due to economic abuse, were not considered by
the tax courts). Tax courts may be unfamiliar with the dynamic of “separation assault,” where
victims are often at greatest danger when terminating the relationship. Id.; see also Martha
R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1991).
147
See Mahoney, supra note 145, at 65 (explaining separation violence “as a specific
type of attack that occurs at or after the moment she decides on a separation or begins to
prepare for one”).
148
Clarke, supra note 128, at 847.
141
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unreasonable evidentiary standard for proving abuse.149 Other tax courts discount
protection orders issued in family law matters as sufficient evidence of abuse.150
Even in instances where the requesting spouse demonstrates that she suffered
physical violence, there is no guarantee that a court will recognize her claim.151
Of particular concern is the tax courts’ lack of understanding of economic abuse
as a form of domestic violence. Courts are suspicious of financial abuse claims and
demand a high level of substantiation often impossible to obtain.152 An absence of
regulatory guidance further complicates efforts to achieve tax relief. Jacqueline
Clarke’s empirical study of claims for equitable relief reveals the challenges victims
have when facing “judicial reluctance” to find financial abuse as sufficient to meet
the tax code requirements.153
(c) Tax Benefits: The Affordable Care Act and Earned Income Tax Credit
Income taxes are not the only realm of tax law of concern to abuse victims. The
ACA provides tax benefits crucial for low-income persons unable to afford health
insurance on their own.154 Under the ACA, married taxpayers seeking the tax credit
must file joint returns.155 Although some exceptions to the joint filing requirement
149

See, e.g., Sotuyo v. Comm’r, No. 25692-10S, 2012 WL 1021306, at *5 (T.C. Mar.
27, 2012); see also Clarke, supra note 128, at 847-848 (citing Collier v. Comm’r, 83 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1799 (T.C. June 10, 2002), wherein the tax court refused to credit evidence from
witnesses to emotional abuse and testimony from a psychologist who treated her for
depression).
150
Clarke, supra note 128, at 850.
151
See, e.g., Ladehoff v. Comm’r, No. 16814-10S, 2012 WL 612501, at *3 (T.C. Feb.
27, 2012) (denying a claim for equitable relief for a victim with two police reports
documenting domestic battery).
152
Nihiser v. Comm’r, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1531 (2008), 2008 WL 2120983 at *9
(quoting a judge who stated, “spouses, in trying to escape financial liability, may easily
exaggerate the level of nonphysical abuse. Innocent-spouse cases often spring from the
dissolution of troubled marriages, and there is an obvious incentive to vilify the
nonrequesting spouse.”).
153
Clarke, supra note 128, at 853; see also requirements under 26 U.S.C. § 6015(b)(1)
(2012); Haar, supra note 50, at 492 (noting the “stringent” provisions of aspects of innocent
spouse relief).
154
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401,
124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). The tax credit, known as the Premium Tax Credit, is explained by the I.R.S. as
“provid[ing] financial assistance to pay the premiums for the qualified health plan offered
through a Marketplace by reducing the amount of tax you owe, giving you a refund, or
increasing your refund amount.” See IRS, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8962 (PREMIUM TAX
CREDIT) (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8962.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NSRA2MX].
155
26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(1)(C) (2012).
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were enacted as part of the ACA, twenty-eight U.S. Senators urged the IRS to issue
additional guidance in an attempt to further ameliorate the consequences of the
requirement of marriage on victims of abuse.156 The subsequent regulations
promulgated by the IRS allow victims of domestic violence to file as if they were
not married.157 The regulations enacted to implement the ACA’s domestic violence
exception was written broadly to include abuse beyond the prototypical physical
abuse, although economic or financial abuse is not specifically referenced.158
Similarly, individuals who are not divorced and wish to file as a single taxpayer
are prohibited by tax regulations from claiming Earned Income Tax Credit
(“EITC”), one of the most important tax benefits to low-income working families.159
Domestic violence victims who face particular obstacles, if not danger, when
seeking a divorce are especially burdened by these regulations.160 Their options
include filing a joint return, demonstrating eligibility to file as a single taxpayer, or
qualifying to file as the head of household.161
(d) Assessing the Usefulness of the ACA and EITC Exceptions
Notwithstanding the developing regulatory interface between tax credits and
the issue of domestic violence, the law leaves many issues unresolved. As with the
IRS form governing relief from joint liability, the form for seeking the ACA’s tax
156
Among the concerns identified were the dangers to a victim for having to disclose
her address as required on a joint return, disclose information about her bank account, and
that given the dynamics of abuse, she would not likely benefit from any refund. See Press
Release, Michael Bennet, Casey Stand Up for Health Care for Domestic Violence Victims,
(Dec. 22, 2011), https://www.bennet.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2011/12/bennet-caseystand-up-for-health-care-for-domestic-violence-victims [https://perma.cc/S7SU-S8D7]. For
an overview of this issue, see David S. Mitchell, An Unhappy Union: Married Taxpayers
Filing Separately and the Affordable Care Act’s Premium Tax Credit, 69 TAX L. 453 (2016);
see also Eligibility for Premium Tax Credit for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 2014-16 I.R.B.
942 (2014).
157
Treas. Reg. § 1.36B-2T(b)(2)(ii) (2014).
158
Id.
159
See I.R.C. § 32(d) (Supp. 2017). Rules prohibit those whose filing status is married
filing separately. See also Do I Qualify for EITC?, IRS https://www.irs.gov/creditsdeductions/individuals/earned-income-tax-credit/do-i-qualify-for-earned-income-tax-credit
-eitc [https://perma.cc/6XPP-9AFH] (last visited July 10, 2019); CTR. ON BUDGET AND
POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (June 21, 2019),
https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-eitc.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9HFE-5BWX] (describing the importance of EITC in raising people out of poverty).
160
See Mahoney, supra note 146, at 5–6.
161
See IRS, TAX INFORMATION FOR SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC ABUSE (2017),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3865.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NZY-NRZG] [hereinafter
TAX INFORMATION FOR SURVIVORS]; see also Fred B. Brown, Permitting Abused Spouses to
Claim the Earned Income Tax Credit in Separate Returns, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
453, 455 (2016).
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benefit is complicated.162 An applicant must live apart and separate from the abuser,
a requirement that prejudices a victim for whom separation is either financially
impossible or would otherwise expose her to higher levels of violence.163 She is
directed to consult another seventy-nine page IRS publication for guidance as to
evidentiary requirements.164 The worksheet requires her to have access to financial
information165 that might not be available to her, given the dynamic of economic
abuse where perpetrators hide documents to prevent the victim from having
knowledge of or control over marital or separate funds. Moreover, the exception is
limited to three years, after which she will be denied relief.166
The EITC’s options for victims of domestic violence fare no better. A victim is
unlikely to file joint returns, as doing so would require ongoing contact with an
abuser and would likely result in a refund that she would not be able to access. The
many obstacles to obtaining a divorce may render her ineligible to claim single
taxpayer status.167 Head of household status is also not likely to provide meaningful
relief, as it may put her in conflict with the abuser, who may also seek to claim such
status; moreover, she may not qualify if she did not live separately from her spouse
for more than six months.168 As one tax expert has explained, “the first option may
be undesirable given the particular circumstances surrounding the abuse, and the
second and third options may be either unattainable or only attainable by taking steps
that may not be in the best interests of an individual from the standpoint of overall
well-being.”169
(e) Tax Law and Social Policy: Domestic Violence and the Need for
Broad Reforms
Though forward-thinking reforms have been enacted, tax law is of limited use
to victims of domestic violence who are economically impacted by the tax code’s
default filing preferences and who are unlikely to obtain legal assistance with tax
162
I.R.S. Form 8962 is a 20-page form with no guidance on qualifying for the PTC. It
refers an applicant to a 27-page instruction publication requiring math computation and other
information that might be considered intimidating, if not complicated, for most individuals.
See IRS, 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8962, 2 (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i8962.pdf [https://perma.cc/28N4-VKR2] [hereinafter IRS, FORM 8962]
163
See Mahoney, supra note 146, at 5–6.
164
See IRS, FORM 8962, supra note 162, at 5–6 (referring to IRS publication 974).
165
Id. at 6.
166
Id. at 5.
167
See Mahoney, supra note 146, at 44–49.
168
Among other types of proof, head of household status requires that the parties have
lived apart for more than six months prior to the end of the year. See TAX INFORMATION FOR
SURVIVORS, supra note 161.
169
Brown, supra note 161, at 455; see also id. at 466 (explaining “divorce or
maintenance of a separate household may not be feasible from a financial perspective, and
qualifying as a head of household would be impossible absent a dependent child”).
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issues that are complicated to resolve, as explained above.170 An analysis of the tax
code and its impact on the economic consequences of IPV must also extend beyond
the particular provisions that purport to address the specific problem related to
domestic violence. As some tax policy experts have correctly argued, tax matters are
feminist issues which require a broader set of reforms in order to support “genderresponsive public services, social protections, and infrastructure required to fulfill
the human rights of all women and achieve gender equality.”171 Tax reforms must
also address the ways that tax policies impact racial and ethnic minorities, as well as
single women with disproportionately negative effects.172 Indeed, any tax reform
meant to address domestic violence must also attend to the ways in which tax policy
contributes to disparities in income and wealth, and acts to corrode all aspects of
family life. 173
As Anne Alstott has observed, “our politicians hide economic and social policy
in the tax code and leave administration to the IRS.”174 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act (“TCJA”)175 legislation—acknowledged to be “one of the greatest tax transfers
of wealth to the rich in modern times”176—cannot but exacerbate the underlying
170

It is worth noting that tax law and domestic violence law tend to be siloed in their
respective fields of practice.
171
Liz Nelson, Tax Justice Is a Feminist Issue: Call on Governments to Act, TAX
JUSTICE NETWORK (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.taxjustice.net/2018/03/08/tax-justice-is-afeminist-issue-call-on-governments-to-act/ [https://perma.cc/XQ3H-F2K2] (quoting GATJ
Statement 8 March 2018, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR TAX JUSTICE (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://www.globaltaxjustice.org/en/latest/gatj-statement-8-march-2018 [https://perma.cc/
Q27Q-5NTX]).
172
Dorothy A. Brown, Racial Equality in the Twenty-First Century: What’s Tax Policy
Got to Do with It?, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 759, 768 (1999) (discussing “[t]he
federal tax laws’ role in reinforcing societal racism must be . . . challenged and ultimately
eliminated.”); Akari Atoyama-Little, Taxing Single Mothers: A Critical Look at the Tax
Code, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2146, 2181 (2013) (noting that although facially neutral, the tax
code favors the idealized “nuclear family” of married parents with children living in homes
they own, and denies many benefits to single mothers); Leo P. Martinez, Latinos and the
Internal Revenue Code: A Tax Policy Primer for the New Administration, 20 HARV. LATINX
L. REV. 101, 116 (2017) (observing that white taxpayers are the primary beneficiaries of
EITC).
173
Coker & Macquoid, supra note 17, at 593–95, 610 (describing the relationships
between policies that make people poorer and their direct impact on increasing rates of
domestic violence).
174
Anne Alstott, How the Tax Bills Target Good Government, Workers, and
Young People, LAW & POL. ECON. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017/11/20/how-thetax-bills-target-good-government-workers-and-young-people/#more-399 [https://perma.cc/
PEQ2-NZ8J].
175
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (Supp. 2017)).
176
Zak Manfredi, Tax Policy Is Human Rights Policy, LAW & POL. ECON. (Feb. 1,
2018),
https://lpeblog.org/2018/02/01/tax-policy-is-human-rights-policy/#more-521
[https://perma.cc/E3Z4-D33X].
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conditions that contribute to gender violence and its relationship to economic
strain.177 The TCJA reduces public sector funding and “literally tax[es] good
governance by raising federal taxes on residents of states with robust and ambitious
governments.”178 It drastically reduces taxes on the wealthiest, further depriving
public funds needed to sustain government social services, including those upon
which domestic violence victims rely.179 The political economy of tax policies at
large have a significant impact on the issue of gender violence and serve to expose
the political-economic underpinnings of this and other social problems.180
C. Legal Responses to Economic Abuse at the State Level
1. Domestic Violence Protection Orders
Domestic Violence Protection Orders (“DVPOs”) are the most commonly
sought remedy to protect a victim from continued violence.181 Unlike other forms of
family law-related relief, victims need not be married to the abuser to seek a remedy,
and court-sanctioned forms facilitate the navigation of the process pro se.182 DVPOs
can be issued in all states via legislation that provides statutory authority for judges
to issue orders with wide-ranging relief.183 In addition to enjoining further acts or
threats of violence, judges may award custody, stipulate visitation, and adjudicate
exclusive use of the parties’ residence, as well as require economic relief, including

177

See Weissman, supra note 12, at 428–430; Shawn F. Greene, The TCJA and TaxExempt Healthcare Organizations, 30 TAX’N EXEMPTS 23, 23 (Aug. 2018).
178
See Alstott, supra note 174 (explaining that the 2017 tax legislation eliminates the
deduction for state and local taxes with implications for those political subdivisions that
provide extensive services to their residents).
179
Greene, supra note 177, at 2 (observing the likely impact on tax-exempt health care
services).
180
See Naomi Fowler, Women, Tax And Equality: Yet Again, The Burden Is
Disproportionately Borne by Women, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2016),
https://www.taxjustice.net/2016/11/24/women-tax-equality-yet-burden-disproportionatelyborne-women/ [https://perma.cc/7UCR-BNXK].
181
Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence:
Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487,
1489 (2008) [hereinafter, Goldfarb, Civil Protection Orders].
182
Self-Representation Resource Guide, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-Fairness/Self-Representation/Resource-Guide.
aspx [http://perma.cc/N9AS-LZDC] (last updated Sept. 17, 2018); Elizabeth L. MacDowell,
Domestic Violence and the Politics of Self-Help, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 203, 214
(2016). But see Weissman, Gender-Based Violence, supra note 46, at 1127–28 (critiquing
the use of boilerplate forms).
183
Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1043–44 (2014); Goldfarb, Civil Protection
Orders, supra note 181, at 1503–04.
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child support and spousal support.184 Notwithstanding questions about the efficacy
of DVPOs, studies suggest that such orders are more likely to be of use to victims if
a judge orders comprehensive relief that not only enjoins further violence but also
remediates the consequences of past violence.185
(a) Domestic Violence Protection Orders and Economic Relief
For a victim with children, an award of child support as part of a DVPO is often
an important factor that determines her ability to exit an abusive relationship.186
Notwithstanding judges’ statutory authority to issue child support orders in DVPO
cases, studies demonstrate that few courts address economic matters such as child
support.187 One study found that courts were less likely to award child support
compared with other requests for relief.188 When responding to queries about their
refusal to engage in DVPO-related child support matters, judges offered a range of
reasons related to “real and perceived institutional constraints,” including lack of
staff to complete child support guidelines and concern that such a “messy” task
184

Heather R. Parker, Access Denied: The Disconnect Between Statutory and Actual
Access to Child Support for Civil Protection Order Petitioners, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 271, 280–
81 (2007). For a helpful overview of the failure of legislation and courts to address economic
abuse, see Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming
Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1134–38 (2009).
185
TK Logan et al., Protective Orders in Rural and Urban Areas, 11 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 876, 906 (2005).
186
See Child Support and Domestic Violence, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov.
28,
2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/child-support-and-domesticviolence.aspx [https://perma.cc/BU9Q-YJ6U] (“[C]hild support payments can be a critical
source of financial stability”); Leigh Goodmark, Achieving Batterer Accountability in the
Child Protection System, 93 KY. L.J. 613, 634 (2004).
187
Doug Yearwood et al., N.C. CRIM. JUST. ANALYSIS CTR., DEP’T OF CRIME CONTROL
& PUBLIC SAFETY, Child Support Application Filing Rates and Domestic Violence
Protection Order Cases, SYSTEMSTATS 1 (Summer 2007); SUSAN KEILITZ, SPECIALIZATION
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASE MANAGEMENT IN THE COURTS: A NATIONAL SURVEY 22
(Feb. 5, 2001), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/186192.pdf [https://perma.cc/84P
K-K2AA]; JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF
JUDICIAL RESPONSES, 128–29 (1999) (noting that judge believed child support as part of a
DVPO was unimportant); Sarah M. Buel, De Facto Witness Tampering, 29 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 72, 84–85 (2014); Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom:
Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 371 (2014);
Mayumi Waddy, Family Law Restraining Orders and Domestic Violence, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 87, 90 (2000); Weissman, Gender-Based Violence, supra note 46, at 1110
n.160 (noting a statewide survey revealing a failure of judges to grant child support and other
comprehensive relief).
188
N.C. CRIM. JUST. ANALYSIS CTR., DEP’T OF CRIME CONTROL & PUBLIC SAFETY,
Dispositional Outcomes of Domestic Violence Ex-Parte and Domestic Violence Protective
Orders, SYSTEMSTATS, 1, 7 (Winter 2002) https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/div/GCC/systemstats
/winter02.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VBP-WMDU].
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might fall to them.189 Some judges do not consider DVPO proceedings a proper
forum for considering child support requests despite statutory authority for such
relief.190 Other studies demonstrate that courts consider economic relief
unimportant, and limit their attention to threats of physical violence.191 Professor
James Ptacek’s courtroom observations of DVPO proceedings suggest that courts
declined to grant economic remedies to poor and working-class women of color for
reasons related to race and class bias and stereotyping.192 Even “innovative” court
initiatives, such as Family Service Centers, which seek to combine domestic
violence-related governmental and community services in one location, have failed
to provide child support services at these centers.193 Judicial reluctance to consider
economic relief as part of a DVPO has induced attorneys to forego such claims and
dissuaded lay advocates from encouraging victims to include such requests in their
petitions to the court.194
(b) Domestic Violence Protection Order Relief and the Privatized Family
Whether the issuance of a DVPO with a child support order would provide
meaningful relief under any circumstances is a vexed question. While a child support
order as part of a DVPO would provide important support in some cases—and courts
should be willing to make such orders—there are many circumstances in which child
support provides little or no meaningful relief. First, the abuser may suffer the loss
of employment as a result of the DVPO process, which is a problem for victims
dependent on his income.195 The failure to pay court-ordered child support is treated
189

Parker, supra note 184, at 289–90; see also Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding in Civil
Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for Compassionate
Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 567, 584, 598 n.95 (2003) (noting that as
a general matter, there is “anti-victim bias and open hostility toward battered women on the
part of judges and court officials”).
190
Yearwood et al., supra note 187, at 1.
191
Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An
Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 190,
206 (1993) (reporting that child support requests are most often denied). See Parker, supra
note 184, at 293 (quoting a judge who did not want to hear child support matters in DVPO
cases who stated, “[y]ou’ve got to be able to get back into doing more serious court business
in this community”).
192
PTACEK, supra note 187, at 127–133.
193
See, e.g., Martha Wade Steketee et al., Implementing an Integrated Domestic
Violence Court: Systemic Change in the District of Columbia, STATE JUST. INST. (June 30,
2000) (reporting that 65% of respondents who participated in a study among victims at the
District of Columbia Domestic Violence Intake Center never filed a child support petition).
For an overview of Family Justice Centers, see Jane Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, 39
HARV. J. LAW & GENDER 189 (2016).
194
Yearwood et al., supra note 187, at 10.
195
Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Vulnerability, Access to Justice, and the Fragmented State,
23 MICH. J. RACE & L. 51, 61 (2018).
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as a criminal matter with the same outcome.196 In an ironic twist of circumstances,
research demonstrates that fathers unable to pay court-ordered child support
thereupon to face contempt charges, increased fines and penalties, if not jail time,
often appeal for financial assistance from their families.197 In these circumstances,
the victim herself, who for various reasons wishes to avoid the possibility of his
incarceration, often agrees to provide monetary support to the perpetrator.198
Second, the DVPO process may not only fail to provide economic relief, but
also may exacerbate a victim’s economic circumstances. Victims seeking a DVPO
may suffer a monetary loss as a result of time away from employment to attend court
or other disruptions associated with seeking relief, losses that studies demonstrate
are rarely recouped.199 The financial price for protection often worsens a woman’s
earning inequality and increases economic insecurity.200
Third, the potential for increased violence associated with the pursuit of child
support has been an issue about which much has been written.201 Some abusers will
196
See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material
Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1016 (2000) (describing
a Miami-Dade ordinance that required the clerk of the court to notify a perpetrator’s
employer of a conviction of domestic violence offense, which often resulted in “direct and
predictable harm for poor women of color” due to the disproportionate impact of the
ordinance on poor men and men of color); Kathryn Edin, Child Support in the Age of
Complex Families, 34 ISSUES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (Winter 2018) (noting that one
study found that “12%-13%—roughly one out of eight—nonmarital children covered by a
child support order had seen their father incarcerated for nonpayment of child support by the
time they reached age nine”); Cortney E. Lollar, Criminalizing (Poor) Fatherhood, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 125, 127–28 (2018) (providing an overview of instances where states criminally
prosecute parents for failure to pay child support); see also Elizabeth G. Patterson, Turner in
the Trenches: A Study of How Turner v. Rogers Affected Child Support Contempt
Proceedings, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 75, 87 (2017).
197
MITALI NAGRECHA ET AL., CTR. FOR CMTY. ALTERNATIVES, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS,
FINING THE FAMILY 19–20, 23 (2014), http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/CriminalJustice-Debt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW95-YNUV].
198
Id. at 24.
199
Hughes & Brush, supra note 37, at 158 (demonstrating the “tremendous earnings
instability and financial costs for PFA petitioners”).
200
Id. at 159.
201
This article does not elaborate on the heightened dangers of pursuing child support
as there has been voluminous writings about this topic. See, e.g., Stacy Brustin & Lisa
Vollendorf Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended Consequences of Federal
Proposals to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803 (2015); Ann
Cammett, Expanding Collateral Sanctions: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Child Support
Enforcement Against Incarcerated Parents, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 313 (2006);
CASEY ET AL., supra note 100, at 14–15; Parker, supra note 184, at 287 (demonstrating
increased violence for victims in states with strict child support enforcement laws that also
require paternity testing); see also Naomi Stern, Battered by the System: How Advocates
Against Domestic Violence Have Improved Victims’ Access to Child Support and TANF, 14
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 47, 54–55 (2003).
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increase their violence in response to receiving a child support order, a problem well
documented in the literature that cautions against forcing victims to reveal to TANF
the names of the father of their children.202 Indeed, Congress recognized the dilemma
by providing states the option to allow welfare victims to seek a waiver of the child
support enforcement cooperation requirement.203
Fourth, legal responses to social concerns involving families must consider
larger structural concerns regarding economic inequality and the lives people
actually lead. The effectiveness of DVPOs with child support orders must be
analyzed in a larger context of the law’s treatment of families as privatized and selfsufficient units for which the state has eschewed responsibility.204 As noted above,
fathers are often criminalized for being indigent, and courts often fail to differentiate
between those who will not pay and those who cannot.205 Other structural barriers to
stable employment, including educational opportunities and housing, particularly for
men of color, are concerns far removed from laws pertaining to child support.206
Child support is essential to leaving abusive relationships. Not as clear,
however, is who pays, how much, and in what form. Proposals have been made for
a child support assurance plan for all children as an add on to social security, in a
system that would resemble European models that offer guaranteed state-paid child
support payments; but these proposals have gained no traction in the United
States.207 As Jill Hasday has written, “[t]he family law canon treats family law and
welfare law as wholly separate categories.”208 The punitive focus on fathers who fail
to pay support without consideration of the structural circumstances that shape
poverty is detrimental to both parents and children. Professor Daniel Hatcher has
aptly written, “[a]lthough we may crave to line up on one side of the fight, the reality
202

Brustin & Vollendorf Martin, supra note 201, at 837–841.
See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (2012).
204
For an overview of the failures of the state to support families, see MAXINE EICHNER,
THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS
(2010).
205
See Lollar, supra note 196, at 127–28; Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or
Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support for Poor Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 1003
(2006); see also KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN:
FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY 41–42 (2013).
206
See Hillard Pouncy, Towards a Fruitful Policy Discourse About Less-Educated
Young Men, in BLACK MALES LEFT BEHIND 293, 301 (Ronald B. Mincy ed., 2006) (noting
insufficient efforts toward incorporating young poor men into the job market—still leaving
them unemployed). This is particularly the case for young black men. See Ronald B. Mincy
& Hillard Pouncy, Fatherhood Programs May Lift Up Young Men, DESERET NEWS (Apr. 17,
2006),
https://www.deseret.com/2006/4/17/19948598/fatherhood-programs-may-lift-upyoung-men [https://perma.cc/F9ML-DKQT].
207
Martha A. Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 1, 21 (2004); Bryce Covert, The Brilliant Idea from Europe that Could Revolutionize Child
Support, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 16, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2015/04/16/
3647872/walter-scott-child-support/ [https://perma.cc/S462-W4D5].
208
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 832 (2004).
203
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is that there are no sides. Low-income mothers and fathers simply do not all fit
within current theoretical or politically themed boxes.”209
2. Family Law Property and Spousal Support Regimes
Family law statutes govern the distribution of assets between intimate partners
when their relationships end. In addition to child support, property distribution and
spousal support are the primary mechanisms by which courts allocate resources
between divorcing spouses.210 Courts may also allocate responsibility for joint
debts.211 A victim of domestic violence may have acquired assets to distribute upon
divorce, for example: a home, automobiles, bank accounts, and pensions.
(a) Obtaining Family-Law Related Economic Relief: Access and
Obstacles
Access to family court is often the first challenge to victims of domestic
violence seeking an allocation of assets and debt. Like many family law litigants, a
victim of domestic violence may be unable to afford an attorney.212 Without an
attorney, she will face significant obstacles to seeking a distributive award of assets.
Some, but not all, judicial districts have made available pro se forms in divorce
cases. However, court clerks report that pro se litigants have difficulty using them
and family law attorneys express concern that vulnerable spouses without legal

209

Daniel L. Hatcher, Don’t Forget Dad: Addressing Women’s Poverty by Rethinking
Forced and Outdated Child Support Policies, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 775,
777 (2012); see also Reginald Mombrun, An End to the Deadbeat Dad Dilemma?Puncturing the Paradigm by Allowing a Deduction for Child Support Payments, 13
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 211, 215–16 (2008) (decrying the use of the term “deadbeat
dad” or “deadbeat parent”).
210
For non-married couples, the judicial avenues for asset distribution fall outside of
the traditional family law statutes; these families must resort to contractual arrangements or
equitable theories such as purchase money or constructive trusts, matters outside the scope
of this article.
211
See generally Margaret M. Mahoney, The Equitable Distribution of Marital Debts,
79 UMKC L. REV. 445 (2010) [hereinafter Mahoney, Marital Debts] (analyzing the common
law property laws that govern responsibility for the payment of individual and joint debts).
212
Bibeane Metsch-Garcia, Eliminating Financiers from the Equation: A Call for
Court-Mandated Fee Shifting in Divorces, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1271, 1292 (2015) (noting
how “extremely costly” to obtain counsel, even if they lack substantial assets to quarrel over);
Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using
Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 ST.
MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 166, 199–200 (2012) (noting that “[i]t is not just
the poor” who cannot afford to hire an attorney but that the inability to afford counsel extends
to “the middle class,” or “individuals of ordinary means”) (internal quotations omitted).
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counsel may be exploited when seeking relief without representations.213 In those
circumstances where an abused spouse succeeds in filing for divorce-related relief,
she will face the additional challenge of judicial bias because of her gender as well
as the nature of family law claims deemed by judges to be “low status cases.”214
When domestic violence is an added complication, bias toward such claims further
disadvantages the litigant.215
Courts often give little weight to allegations of domestic violence when
determining the equitable allocation of resources at divorce or separation. This is an
outcome of the shift in family law from an emphasis on “fault” as a paramount factor
shaping distribution decisions to the premises of “no-fault” and the ways that courts
understand “gender neutrality.”216 As Professor Jill Hasday describes, state
legislatures have absolved courts of the need to be concerned with women’s
economic positions following divorce:
Courts have also relied on the premise that women’s legal subordination
under coverture has been excised from family law in concluding that
divorce law no longer needs to be worried about divorced women’s status.
They explain, for instance, that the former complete protective role of the
court regarding alimony is no longer necessary because [t]he law formerly
attaching . . . subjection to the legal status of a married woman has been
abolished either by legislation or by the continuous pressure of judicial
interpretation.217
Such a rationale tends to obscure the impact of economic abuse as a
consequence of IPV; moreover, as Hasday observes, such pronouncements are
premature.218 Studies continue to demonstrate that, with regard to economic

213
Jessica Dixon Weaver, Overstepping Ethical Boundaries? Limitations on State
Efforts to Provide Access to Justice in Family Courts, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2705, 272–23
(2014).
214
Jessica Pearson, Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century
Families, 33 FAM. L.Q. 617, 630 (1999) (noting the low status of family law cases); Elizabeth
L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. J.
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 496 (2015); Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and
Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, BYU L. REV. 899, 965 n.283 (2016).
215
See Laura Gatland, Courts Behaving Badly, 83 A.B.A. J. 30, 31 (1997); Weissman,
Gender-Based Violence, supra note 46, at 1118 (noting that judges often act upon domestic
violence issues as less important, private, and not the courts’ concerns).
216
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 835–36 (2004).
This shift is predicated on a “canonical understanding of the relationship between family law
and social inequality” that assumes that women no longer suffer inequality before the law.
Id. at 830.
217
Id. at 867–869 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
218
Id. at 870.
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measures following divorce, women fare poorly and disproportionately so when
compared to men.219
With the shift from marital misconduct and protection of the spouse against
ongoing economic harm to no-fault divorces and equitable distribution, domestic
violence has been perceived as irrelevant and thus no longer considered an issue for
inquiry by family law attorneys.220 The Chief Reporter of the American Law
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution has disputed the need to
include domestic violence as a consideration in property distribution.221 Drafters of
the Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital Agreements eliminated specific
references to domestic violence as a factor in spousal support matters in the belief
that spouses could rely on the more general heading of “substantial hardship,”
notwithstanding the optional nature of such provision.222
When a victim of abuse does raise domestic violence as a factor that weighs in
her favor for a greater distribution, she may be referred to alternative dispute
mechanisms.223 As a result, domestic violence as a factor bearing on distribution of
assets is rarely heard by judges.224 On those few occasions when the issue of
domestic violence, as pertinent to spousal support claims, does reach the court for
adjudication, judges have outright rejected the issue as inappropriate for
consideration in reliance of no-fault statutes.225 Where courts are authorized to
219

See, e.g., Yitshak Cohen, Issues Subject to Modification in Family Law: A New
Model, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 313, 360 (2014); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of
Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1,
5 n.13 (2008); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now
More than Ever, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 569, 579 (2014).
220
The Family Violence Project of the National Council of Juvenile and Family &
Court Judges, Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and
Legal Practice, 29 FAM. L.Q. 197, 212 (1995).
221
Cheryl J. Lee, Escaping the Lion’s Den and Going Back for Your Hat - Why
Domestic Violence Should Be Considered in the Distribution of Marital Property upon
Dissolution of Marriage, 23 PACE L. REV. 273, 299–300 (2002); see also NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS; UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 308, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS (1970),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Marriage%20and%20Divorce%20Act/UMDA%2
01973.pdf (containing no provisions considering domestic violence or fault); Michelle L.
Evans, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child that No Area of the Law Wants to
Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465, 466–67, 481 (2009).
222
Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital
Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 334–35, 342 (2012).
223
Pearson, supra note 214, at 621, 626.
224
Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving
Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 259 (2011).
225
Ali Kunen, Divorce and Domestic Violence in the United States: A Focus on New
York State’s Adoption of No-Fault Legislation and Its Impact on the Incidence of Domestic
Violence, 11 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 353, 365 (2013). Kunen’s article appeared
before the amendment of New York State’s Domestic Relations law that now allows for
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consider the abuse in the more general category of “marital fault,” victims are
required to show that the violence was “egregious,” a standard that in one case was
not met despite evidence of twenty-seven incidents of physical assault.226 In the few
states where domestic violence remains a statutory consideration in establishing
distribution awards, it is only one factor balanced against the victim’s economic selfsufficiency.227 Thus, a victim who has continued working, despite having suffered
economic abuse, may be penalized for her efforts to minimize her harm.228
Finally, victims of domestic violence may fare no better with regard to the
distribution of debts in family court. As Professor Angela Littwin has explained:
for practical purposes, divorce decrees only have the authority to divide
assets, not debts. Even if a divorce court decides that an abusive spouse is
responsible for paying a debt he has fraudulently or coercively incurred in
the survivor's name, creditors still consider the survivor liable, so a
division of debt favoring her will be only a paper victory.229
Moreover, family courts have been reluctant to allocate responsibility for debts in
divorce matters.230
(b) The Failure of Family Law Distribution Schemes: Private not Public
The analysis above demonstrates courts’ lack of willingness to award economic
relief to victims of IPV even when laws authorize such relief. However, the critique
of the legal response to economic abuse is only in part related to the failure of the
courts to apply statutory relief. In fact, existing laws fail to provide more than
consideration of domestic violence, one of the few states that does so. Whether the
amendments are sufficiently protective are questionable given the somewhat limited
definition of domestic violence. See N.Y. DOM REL. L. § 236(B)(6)(e)(1)(g); N.Y. SOC.
SERV. L. § 459-a(1) (defining “victim of domestic violence”); see also Andrea B. Carroll,
Family Law and Female Empowerment, 24 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 27 (2017) (noting that
only a handful of states specifically include domestic violence as a factor in spousal support
matters).
226
Lee, supra note 221, at 286, 288; Edward S. Snyder & Laura W. Morgan, Domestic
Violence Ten Years Later, 19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 33, 53 (2004).
227
Carroll, supra note 225, at 28.
228
Id. (observing that proving domestic violence does not mean that spousal support
will be ordered); Lee, supra note 221, at 290.
229
Littwin, supra note 10, at 957 (citation omitted).
230
Mahoney, Marital Debts, supra note 211, at 446; but see Scott Thistle, Bill Would
Protect Domestic Violence Survivors from Economic Toll that Abusers Take, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.pressherald.com/2019/04/02/bill-would-protectdomestic-violence-survivors-from-economic-abuse/?fbclid=IwAR3uc8oPrW_iuouJOjHwx
fgSzFv2YuoK4sFGPpzRI6sjvBCmdL1lCLQC7yY
[http://perma.cc/JD2J-ZC6C]
(describing a bill introduced into the Maine state legislature that “aimed at freeing survivors
from bad debts racked up by their abusers”).
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nominal redress for the consequences of abuse and offer no remedy to the structural
sources of the problem. Spousal support payments may serve to maintain ties
between the parties, an obvious concern for victims wishing to exit from the
relationship. Perhaps less obvious but just as troublesome—and not dissimilar to the
failures of child support enforcement regimes discussed above—frequently, there is
simply not enough to meet the family’s needs.231 And there is little law that considers
and remedies the structural causes of these private dilemmas. Professor Maxine
Eichner has aptly described these circumstances: “The family in the United States is
often considered private, but increasingly it has become privatized.”232
Distribution claims, as Professor Anne Alstott has observed, are often a “zerosum struggle for resources,” pointing out that “[i]ndividuals have no right to the
resources they need to marry, to divorce, or even to remain alive (a rather obvious
prerequisite to family life).”233 Family law is private law, Alstott reminds her
readers, and does not invoke the resources of the state to provide for the needs of
family members where the pot of resources to distribute is insufficient for their
wellbeing.234 Domestic violence does not modify that condition. As Alstott points
out, that distribution, however allocated, has few benefits for poor and low-earning
families.235 Similarly, Joan Williams has argued that without assets, “no property
division rule will make a substantial difference in economic well-being after
divorce.”236 Indeed, most divorcing couples do not have sufficient assets to divide
or otherwise ameliorate economic pressures.237 Yet the dominant market-driven
norms have shaped the contours of how family law presumes that divorcing couples
should survive—through self-reliance—even when self-reliance is sabotaged by
social ills such as domestic violence.238
Family law as a mechanism to distribute assets to mitigate IPV is ineffective
because it fails to consider the structural circumstances that contribute to domestic
violence in the first place. Additionally, the law fails to address the need for a better
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2227, 2232 (1994).
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welfare state that would meaningfully improve the lives of all family members.239
Certainly, there is a need for the law’s expressive purpose in formulating a moral
judgment with regard to the breakdown of a marriage due to the actions of a
perpetrator of IPV. Given the political economy of poverty, however, private
solutions whereby the courts attempt to allocate marital assets will never be
sufficient.240 Some commentators have called for a welfare program that provides “a
guaranteed and decent basic income for all, policies of management and cooperative
business [that] can develop and open up new ‘human services for human beings.”’241
But as Professor Susan Appleton observes, in the United States, family law and
welfare law are both “preoccup[ied] with ‘personal responsibility.’”242 Without
greater public protections to address the determinants and consequences of domestic
violence, family breakdown, and support for families generally, family law
decisions will likely inflict suffering on one party or the other.243
D. Concluding on the Law’s Weaknesses
Laws at the federal and state level provide courts with the authority to mitigate
the economic abuse suffered by victims of IPV. Yet, the analysis in this Part
demonstrates the failure to enact such remedies. Whether because of gender animus
toward victims or the disregard for family law matters, including IPV as important
legal claims, victims are unlikely to obtain relief through the exercise of judicial
power. In matters pertaining to the economic consequences of domestic violence,
the law often assumes a “neutral” stance, leaving a victim to benefit or not in the
realm of the private. But the law is anything other than neutral in the configuration
of an economic system that exacerbates gender violence.244 A political-economic
239

See generally MAXINE EICHNER, THE FREE-MARKET FAMILY: HOW THE MARKET
CRUSHED THE AMERICAN DREAM (AND HOW IT CAN BE RESTORED) (forthcoming Dec.
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Liberal State, 93 TUL. L. REV. 599, 639 (2019) (stating that “[t]aking marital misconduct
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not.”).
241
Antonio Negri & Raúl Sánchez Cedillo, For a New Experience of Economic
Government: A Call to Podemos, TRANSVERSAL (Mar. 2015), http://transversal.at/blog/Acall-to-Podemos [https://perma.cc/U5A7-AMAV] (calling for a welfare program that
provides “a guaranteed and decent basic income for all, policies of management and
cooperative business [that] can develop and open up new ‘human services for human
beings’”).
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in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 426, 440 (Robin West & Cynthia
Grant Bowman eds., 2019).
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analysis of legal remedies designed to provide relief in these matters demonstrates
that larger socio-legal and structural changes are required before the law has the
capacity to remedy the problem of domestic violence in ways that redistributes
power and resources in order to inure to the wellbeing of families and
communities.245
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROGRAM POLICIES: “ECONOMIC JUSTICE INITIATIVES”
In addition to reliance on the legal system for relief, domestic violence
advocates have engaged in reflective rethinking about new strategies to address
intersecting issues related to gender violence.246 The social science scholarship has
directed attention to the relevance of poverty and economic concerns to domestic
violence; forms of economic abuse have been recognized as a means of subjugation
with devastating and enduring consequences.247 To be sure, academics and
advocates have increasingly questioned the efficacy of the carceral state as a
response to gender-based violence, noting that the criminal justice system, if not the
legal system more generally, has failed to serve the needs of communities of color,
the poor, immigrants, the disabled, and LGBTQ persons.248 But the mainstream antidomestic violence movement has yet to develop a political-economic analysis
adequate to counterbalance the default reliance on the criminal justice system.249
resistance/#more-2206 [https://perma.cc/44NG-BPNR] (commenting that law “is deeply
implicated in inequality today”).
245
See David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & Jedediah Purdy, Law and Political
Economy: Toward a Manifesto, LAW & POL. ECON. (Nov. 6, 2017), https://lpeblog.org/2017
/11/06/law-and-political-economy-toward-a-manifesto/ [https://perma.cc/88UF-SLZ5].
246
See generally Coker et al., supra note 15 (seeking to “refocus United State priorities
in funding, activism, legal responses, and social services” to better address gender violence).
247
See Rebecca Miles-Doan, Violence Between Spouses and Intimates: Does
Neighborhood Context Matter?, 77 SOC. FORCES 623, 623–25 (1998); see also Michael L.
Benson et al., Violence in Families: The Intersection of Race, Poverty, and Community
Context, in 2 FAMILIES, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91, 91 (Greer Litton Fox & Michael
L. Benson eds., 2000); Gary L. Bowen et al., Neighborhood Characteristics and Supportive
Parenting Among Single Mothers, in 2 FAMILIES, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183, 184–
85 (Greer Litton Fox & Michael L. Benson eds., 2000); Judy A. Van Wyk et al., Detangling
Individual-, Partner-, and Community-Level Correlates of Partner Violence, 49 CRIME &
DELINQ. 412, 413–14 (2003). A National Institute of Justice study demonstrated the role that
different neighborhood conditions (particularly those conditions that relate to poverty and
economic stress) play in producing domestic violence. See Fox & Benson, supra note 13, at
1–6.
248
See supra notes 15 and 16.
249
Goldscheid, supra note 1, at 624–25. For example, the National Organization to End
Domestic Violence advertised its 2018 annual conference with events that mostly focus on
criminal justice strategies and actors. See 18th Annual International Family Justice Center
Conference, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://ncadv.org/Default.aspx?p=157567&evtid=688264:4/24/2018 [https://perma.cc/69B9

2020]

IN PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE

43

Nonetheless, the strength of the data emphasizing the relationship between
economic factors and domestic violence has resulted in a near-obligatory shift in
domestic violence agency services.250
As set forth in Part I, the legal system fails to provide adequate economic
reparations. Many antiviolence advocates promote nonlegal interventions in
response to the weaknesses of the legal system.251 A number of agencies now
program “economic justice initiatives” dedicated to “financial literacy” and
“financial empowerment” to assist with budgeting, credit problems, and credit
worthiness.252 The development of these initiatives, however, has been an uneven
process; and the initiatives vary in terms of the theories and norms they advance.
This Part begins with an overview of the personal financial industry as it relates
to domestic violence victims and financial literacy curricula. It then examines the
prototype approach to “financial empowerment,” which relies on a financial literacy
curriculum adopted by domestic violence programs. It argues that the dominant
financial literacy curriculum is flawed and renders remedies as an issue of personal
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coalitions identified on the Office of Violence Against Women’s webpage found that at least
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Waldron, Allstate Foundation “Purple Purse” Campaign Empowers Survivors of Domestic
Violence, JUST MEANS (Nov. 9, 2015, 3:30AM), http://justmeans.com/blogs/allstatefoundation-purple-purse-campaign-empowers-survivors-of-domestic-violence
[https://perma.cc/W3KM-9NUU].

44

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

responsibility, thereby obscuring the political-economic issues central to the
economic wellbeing of domestic violence victims.
The critique presented in this Part, to borrow a phrase from Professors Alice
Miller and Mindy Roseman, “is offered in the spirit of constructive provocation.”253
It is not meant to suggest that current program policies are regressive or without
value. Indeed, many programs attend to intersectional issues affecting the LGBTQ
community, African American victims, immigrant families, and sex workers; some
programs maintain bilingual websites.254 But agencies that propound a curriculum
based on the premise of a victim empowerment folklore within a culture of self-help
ignore the structural dimensions of debt and offer chimerical solutions to the
structural problems of debt and society.255 They are more likely to subject victims to
market forces that are often the very obstacles to solutions.
A. Personal Financial Industry or Poverty Industry? Possibilities of Economic
Empowerment
The term “personal financial industry” refers to the mechanisms and products
by which individuals, primarily as consumers, are tasked with creating their own
wealth and exercising responsibility for managing assets and debts.256 Access to
loans and incurring debt have developed into an important means of subsistence,
particularly as prospects for stable employment diminish and give way to
unemployment/underemployment, flexibilization of the labor market, and a lack of
real wage growth.257 Consumer debt has become pervasive and, as one scholar has
253

Alice M. Miller & Mindy J. Roseman, Sexual and Reproductive Rights at the United
Nations: Frustration or Fulfillment, 19 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 102, 103 (2011).
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Some state coalitions use problematic financial literacy curricula while working at
the intersection of other progressive issues. See Recent News Information, ARIZ. COALITION
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See Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatization: The
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observed, “has become the last hope for avoiding, reducing, or at least delaying the
pain of marginalization.”258 Financial institutions often snare vulnerable and often
ill-informed borrowers, at times engaging in dubious practices designed to obscure
the difficulties associated with high-interest loans rising to the level of usury.259 Debt
as a way of life has become something of a cultural phenomenon and functions as a
means of social control.260 Financial deregulation has “spawned various species of
hyper-usury whereby consumer credit risk and national credit ratings have
themselves become tradeable objects. Debt is no longer a means to purchase
commodities; it is a commodity itself, fully fungible in the marketplace” and
contributing to the worst aspects of consumer society.261
1. Indebtedness, Gender, and Domestic Violence
Indebtedness is one of the principal sources of conflict for couples and often a
major source of stress for victims of domestic violence, many of whom face
indigence at the time they seek services.262 Household indebtedness has soared,
particularly as credit and debts replace wages as a principal means of family
subsistence.263 Scholars have observed that the damaging effects of debt as a way of
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life have “deepened pre-existing racial and gendered inequalities in the United
States.”264
The legal system provides little debt-related relief to victims whose debts are
family-related and were coercively incurred by the abuser. Family court orders that
allocate the debt to the abuser will rarely bind the creditor.265 In the context of
debtor-creditor relations, debtors are required to waive their rights to seek judicial
relief and submit to mandatory arbitration, a process that fails to protect their
interests.266 Bankruptcy protection, particularly consumer bankruptcy under Chapter
7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, increasingly has become more restrictive; the
possibilities for filing pro se have diminished while attorney fees associated with
seeking bankruptcy protection have increased.267 Moreover, as Angela Littwin has
pointed out, “because credit reports are simply lists of events–and credit scores are
simply numeric analyses of these events–there is no evaluative process that can
unlink a survivor from her former abuser.”268
Debt-related issues are often gendered. The instability that accompanies
domestic violence generates its own cycle of dysfunction as day-to-day choices are
complicated by financial difficulty.269 Those unable to pay their debts are deemed
irresponsible, and women are particularly susceptible to this stereotype. Women are
said to fail to service debts due to “their nurturing and emotional nature [that] leads
them to make bad financial decisions.”270 They are criticized for lacking confidence,
turning to the “wrong” people for advice as to how to manage their money, spending
when they should be saving, and engaging in “fiscally improvident behavior.”271
Indeed, socially constructed myths about personal economy suggest that anyone can
get ahead if they are careful and live within their means. Disparagements fail to
otherwise acknowledge the historical discrimination by the credit industry against
women, poor people and people of color, and unscrupulous lenders who deploy
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predatory lending practices while targeting these groups.272 Those who fail to repay
debts suffer one more form of victim-blaming along with coercive, threatening, and
harassing conduct by debt collectors, especially when the debtor is black.273
To offer effective assistance to victims with financial problems and credit
burdens, domestic violence programs must first consider the structural realities
associated with indebtedness and the predatory nature of a poorly regulated credit
industry.274 The credit industry targets the underemployed and unemployed who rely
on credit as a substitute for a living wage.275 Women suffer disproportionately from
unscrupulous lending practices.276 Anti-violence advocates must challenge the
corporate entities that conceal self-serving policies in the rhetoric of “corporate
caring and good citizenship” as a means to distract from the larger problematic issues
inherent in the personal financial industry.277 It is not sufficient for programs to adopt
financial literacy programs without addressing the wider threats posed by
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“debtfarism,” which affects and transcends IPV and has served to destabilize
families and society.278
2. The Financial Literacy Curriculum: Austerity and Self-Help
As described in Part I.A, financial abuse often ruins a victim’s financial
wellbeing with long-lasting consequences.279 A victim may face exorbitant debts not
only as a result of fraud and coercion, but also as a function of a financialized
economy that requires families to meet their daily needs through credit mechanisms
that are often predatory and punitive.280 Her economic circumstances may have
resulted in a crushing accumulation of loans. Because poor and working-class people
rely on credit as a means of subsistence, domestic violence advocates would do well
to include remedies to indebtedness as part of the services they offer. Depending on
the approach, however, agencies can mitigate economic hardship or create new ones.
(a) Corporate Sponsored Financial Literacy
The majority of programs rely on corporate financial literacy education
designed by corporate entities whose interests are aligned with financial markets.281
Most have chosen to use the Allstate Foundation’s “Moving Ahead” curriculum for
which they receive funding from the foundation in connection with the use of its
training and materials.282 Allstate claims to provide advocates with “a
comprehensive package of tools and information designed to empower survivors to
understand and manage their finances and to educate and train advocates and
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SOEDERBERG, supra note 258, at 2.
SHARP-JEFFS, supra note 33, at 16.
280
APPEL ET AL., supra note 264, at 11, 15–16 (describing the acquisition of basic
household necessities including utilities and municipal services through debts that may often
carry usurious terms, fees and fines).
281
See supra note 256; see also Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 202 (2008).
282
Waldron, supra note 252 (noting that the Allstate Foundation has trained service
providers representing more than 1,600 nonprofit organizations and has helped provide
“financial literacy and asset building programs [for] domestic violence survivors in all 50
states”). See also generally End Domestic Violence, ALLSTATE FOUNDATION,
https://www.allstatefoundation.org/domestic_violence.html
[https://perma.cc/PY59BGCW] (last visited July 17, 2019). For the curriculum, see Moving Ahead Curriculum,
ALLSTATE FOUNDATION, https://www.purplepurse.com/tools/financial-empowermentprint.aspx [https://perma.cc/UV9W-S5PM] (last visited July 17, 2019); see also Resources,
ALLSTATE FOUNDATION, https://www.allstatefoundation.org/domestic_violence_our_im
pact.html [https://perma.cc/4662-R2DQ]. Of course, domestic violence programs do not
constitute a monolithic entity; however, a review of the national and state domestic violence
coalitions which receive most of the federal VAWA funding suggest that a significant
number have adopted the Allstate Foundation program. See supra note 252 and
accompanying text.
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Allstate volunteers to work with domestic violence survivors as they move forward
on the path to financial security.”283 Allstate is a private foundation of Allstate
Insurance, one of the largest insurance providers in the United States, and a principal
institution of profit accumulation within the global financial sector.284
In addition to Allstate’s program, the National Coalition Against Domestic
Violence, as well as several other state coalitions, have used a curriculum developed
by the National Endowment for Financial Education (“NEFE”) together with
Intuit.285 The NEFE promotes “financial workshop kits” and is described as having
deep roots in the financial services industry.286 Its financial literacy curriculum has
283

Moving Ahead Through Financial Management Curriculum, ALLSTATE
FOUNDATION,
https://www.allstatefoundation.org/domestic_violence_impact.html
[https://perma.cc/F855-JDLY] (last visited July 17, 2019).
284
See
ALLSTATE
FOUNDATION,
https://www.allstatefoundation.org/
[https://perma.cc/FNU3-V687] (last visited July 18, 2019); Our Story, ALLSTATE,
https://ourstory.allstate.com/?_ga=2.123797961.2103417960.1534903966-25884431.1534
903966 [https://perma.cc/QH57-UXCZ] (last visited July 18, 2019); About Us, ALLSTATE,
https://www.allstate.com/about/about.aspx [https://perma.cc/V5AC-7RQK] (last visited
July 22, 2019); see also Adam Hayes, Top 10 Insurance Companies by the Metrics,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Aug.
8,
2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/activetrading/111314/top-10-insurance-companies-metrics.asp
[https://perma.cc/6L9M-3EJB]
(listing Allstate as one of the top property and casualty insurers in the United States);
Sebastian Kohl, Insuring Capitalism: The Political Economy of the Private Insurance
Industry,
MAX
PLANCK
INSTITUTE
FOR
THE
STUDY
OF
SOCIETIES,
http://www.mpifg.de/forschung/projdetails_en.asp?ProjekteID=456 [https://perma.cc/Y5A
W-GU5Z] (last visited July 18, 2019) (“The private insurance industry, and the life insurance
industry in particular, is a central institution of capital accumulation within a country’s
financial sector.”).
285
See Financial Education, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(NCADV), https://ncadv.org/financial-education [https://perma.cc/GU7E-D5DT] (last
visited July 18, 2019); Economic Empowerment Resources, KY. COALITION AGAINST
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE,
https://kcadv.org/content/economic-empowerment-resources
[https://perma.cc/D9UG-EF6E] (last visited July 18, 2019); Webinar: Rebuilding
Financially After Domestic Violence, N.J. COALITION FOR BATTERED WOMEN (Dec. 17,
2015),
http://www.njcedv.org/?s=National+Endowment+for+Financial+Education+
[https://perma.cc/46BQ-WHXK]; NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC. (NEFE),
https://www.financialworkshopkits.org/Workshops/Details/ws/rebuildingfinanciallyafterdo
mesticviolence/ [https://perma.cc/2SQC-56T2] (last visited July 18, 2019). The NCADV and
NEFE developed the curriculum. NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., HOPE AND POWER,
FOR YOUR PERSONAL FINANCES (2002), https://www.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/hope_and_
power_english_version.pdf?1506375199990 [https://perma.cc/DT7L-UYV5] [hereinafter
HOPE AND POWER].
286
Financial Workshop Kits, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC. (NEFE),
https://www.financialworkshopkits.org/ [https://perma.cc/E6RJ-HYAZ] (last visited July
18, 2019); see National Endowment for Financial Education, GUIDESTAR,
https://www.guidestar.org/profile/84-0632115 [https://perma.cc/5JQC-JPZ3] (last visited
July 18, 2019).
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been promoted by Citigroup, Inc.287 Intuit sells products such as Turbo Tax and
QuickBooks, which are designed to “power . . . financial prosperity.”288
(b) Financial Literacy: Patronizing and Punishing
Allstate’s curriculum includes checklists, guidance, and instructions.289 It
provides information on sources of income and approaches to budgets and saving.
In fact, the suggestions can best be characterized as being as unrealistic as they are
condescending. Allstate advises women to earn more income by working more hours
or by creating “a home-based micro-business, such as selling arts and crafts.”290 It
suggests that women shop and overspend for emotional reasons, and offers
substitutes for engaging in consumer purchases. For example, it recommends that
women have a “manicure at home,” or make a “favorite dessert at home.”291 Women
are told they should “avoid eating out,” “limit treats,” and “find cheaper alternatives
in household purchases.”292 Savings on spending for children’s activities can be
accomplished if victims “cook or bake together,” “read them a story,” or “play their
favorite game with them.”293 These suggestions contribute to the myth of the
“fiscally promiscuous American” who spends on small luxuries they do not need.294
Allstate encourages weekly savings as “the best way to ensure . . . future
financial success” due to “the magic in compound interest.”295 Advice regarding
payday lenders is tepid despite the fact that single women comprise the largest

287

See Financial Education Curriculum, CITI, https://www.citigroup.com/citi/citizen/
community/curriculum/adults.htm [https://perma.cc/5JQC-JPZ3] (last visited July 18,
2019).
288
INTUIT, https://www.intuit.com/sandbox/homepage-cta082218/ [https://perma.cc/
N4UF-2V9Y] (last visited July 19, 2019).
289
Allstate Foundation Purple Purse Moving Ahead Curriculum, PURPLE PURSE
ALLSTATE FOUNDATION, https//www.purplepurse.com/resources/purplepurse/attachments/
needv-allstate-module1 [https://perma.cc/PPE6-7DGF] (last visited July 19, 2019). The
modules include Module 1: Understanding Financial Abuse, Module 2: Learning Financial
Fundamentals, Module 3: Mastering Credit Basics, [hereinafter Allstate Part 3], Module 4:
Building Financial Foundations, Module 5: Creating Budget Strategies. Id.
290
PURPLE PURSE ALLSTATE FOUNDATION & NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, MODULE 2: LEARNING FINANCIAL FUNDAMENTALS 9 (2018),
https://www.purplepurse.com/resources/purplepurse/attachments/nnedv-allstate-module2.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PPE6-7DGF] [hereinafter ALLSTATE, MODULE 2].
291
Id. at 10–11.
292
Id. at 9.
293
Id. at 11.
294
OLEN, supra note 256, at 48–51 (describing the “latte factor” as a myth suggesting
that indebted persons overspend on small regular luxuries).
295
ALLSTATE, MODULE 2, supra note 290, at 12.
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segment of payday debtors.296 Instructions with regard to paying debts and using
credit cards are often based on the preferences of the credit industry.297
The NEFE, together with the NCADV and Intuit, offers similar homilies
through the toolkit, “Hope and Power.”298 Their recommendations are similarly
fanciful and even worse, for they offer futile remedies to address the structural issues
that contribute to credit and debt problems. Victims are advised to sell their clothes
at consignment shops, sell caramel apples at local events, shop at garage sales, and
misinform the abuser that prices on home necessities have increased in order to
pocket the difference. 299 Women are encouraged to “look around the house for
stashes of cash” and take it “if [she doesn’t] think he’ll miss it.” 300 The toolkit
reassures her not to “take it personally” if a landlord refuses to rent to her because
she is a victim of domestic violence while failing to acknowledge that such refusal
may constitute unlawful discrimination.301 Other suggestions include a second job
for purposes of paying bills.302 Yet, the Hope and Power toolkit is silent on the matter
of predatory lenders. The possibility that her debts may be unlawful due to illegal
creditor practices is not addressed.303
Both curricula are pernicious for their strategies and their subterfuge. They fail
to address the lived experiences of poor and working women. They practice a kind
of class shaming for which the financial industry is generally well-known.304 They
preach a strategy of lower spending and higher frugality associated with the
neoliberal politics of austerity economics—a politics that has proven unrealistic and
damaging, especially to poor families.305 Darrick Hamilton and William A. Darity,
296

Id. at 15 (advising simply that “before taking this type of loan, explore all other
options”); SOEDERBERG, supra note 258, at 138.
297
ALLSTATE FOUNDATION PURPLE PURSE & NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, MODULE 3: MASTERING CREDIT BASICS 11 (2018), https://www.purplepurse.com
/resources/purplepurse/attachments/nnedv-allstate-module3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PPE67DGF] (advising against closing unused credit cards because of preferred consideration of
credit reporting agencies).
298
See HOPE AND POWER, supra note 285.
299
NEFE, supra note 285, at 23, 49–50.
300
Id. at 23.
301
Id. at 36; see generally Elizabeth M. Whitehorn, Unlawful Evictions of Female
Victims of Domestic Violence: Extending Title VII’s Sex Stereotyping Theories to the Fair
Housing Act, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1419 (2007) (detailing the various types of unlawful sex
discrimination in landlord tenant relationships).
302
NEFE, supra note 285, at 52.
303
HOPE AND POWER, supra note 285, at 14; NEFE, supra note 285, at 14.
304
Matthew P. McAllister & Anna Aupperle, Class Shaming in Post-Recession U.S.
Advertising, 41 J. COMM. COMMC’N INQUIRY 140–141, 147 (2017) (noting such accusations
against Allstate in advertising practices).
305
See Paul Krugman, The Austerity Delusion, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/business/ng-interactive/2015/apr/29/the-austerity-delusion
[https://perma.cc/36FS-7NS3]; Paul Krugman, How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 6, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/06/06/how-case-

52

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 1

writing about wealth disparity and indebtedness in low income and communities of
color, state:
The focus of policy becomes the rehabilitation of the Black family. Herein
lies much of the rationale for austerity policies: If behavioral modification,
particularly with regard to personal and human capital investment, is the
central issue, why fund government agencies and programs . . . ?306
Both curricula propound a type of neoliberal approach to a self-help financial
management program. The inability to achieve financial stability is “a knowledge
and smarts problem that could be solved on an individual basis,” without concern
for structural issues.307 Failure to benefit from financial literacy education is deemed
a personal failure, yet another form of victim-blaming women must endure.308
Advising women to increase hours of work or seek a second job without
introducing the problem of low-paying employment or identifying the organizing
campaigns for a living wage is a strategy that sustains a labor economy that relies
on the flexible worker whose income declines as she works harder.309 Indeed, the
partnership between domestic violence programs and Allstate / the NEFE mirror the
partnership between McDonalds and Visa to “help” their workers live on meager
fast-food wages. The McDonalds-Visa plan offers a similar “sample ‘budget
journal’” described as “a laughably inaccurate view of what it’s like to budget on a

austerity-has-crumbled/ [https://perma.cc/HB2R-MD49]; KRISNAH POINASAMY, OXFAM
INTERNATIONAL, THE TRUE COST OF AUSTERITY AND INEQUALITY: UK CASE STUDY 4 (Sept.
2013), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/cs-true-cost-austerity-inequalityuk-120913-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/GAN5-ZTHY]. Similar patronizing attitudes were
expressed during Congressional debates on ending Obamacare. Christopher Ingraham, If
Jason Chaffetz Wants to Compare Health Care to iPhones, Let’s Do It the Right Way, WASH.
POST (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/07/if-jasonchaffetz-wants-to-compare-healthcare-to-iphones-lets-do-it-the-right-way/?utm_term=.5b7
b8bc28e7e [https://perma.cc/J2YY-PENP] (quoting Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-UT) as stating,
“Americans have choices . . . And so, maybe rather than getting that new iPhone that they
just love and they want to go spend hundreds of dollars on that, maybe they should invest it
in their own health care.”).
306
Hamilton & Darity, supra note 272, at 68; see also Willis, supra note 281, at 68
(describing these programs as “socially pernicious” for blaming individuals and communities
for their financial plight).
307
OLEN, supra note 256, at 22.
308
Id. at 35; see also Willis, supra note 281, at 198 (arguing that financial literacy
education blames and shame consumers for their plight).
309
Kerry Rittich, Families on the Edge: Governing Home and Work in A Globalized
Economy, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1527, 1551 (2010) (describing how the flexibilization of the labor
market has increased economic risks and economic pressure); see also FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN,
https://fightfor15.org/ [https://perma.cc/LA9P-HKXK] (last visited July 21, 2019) (arguing
for an increased national minimum wage).
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minimum wage job, including obtaining a “second job.”310 The toolkits are silent
about the issue of pay inequity and disparities that disadvantage women and affect
their ability to pay bills and save money.311 Absent from either curriculum is a
strategy to engage the credit industry, or address rising health care costs and reduced
health care insurance payments. Also absent is, as Jacob Hacker has described, an
explanation of the “great risk shift” that has largely eliminated the government or
the market as a source of financial security and stability.312 Such matters should be
integral to any meaningful financial literacy program, to provide victims with a
clearer understanding of the structural forces that define the parameters of their
economic circumstances.
In fact, most studies suggest that financial literacy education has little
ameliorating effect on the lives of individuals or families.313 It is cost-ineffective and
psychologically, if not physically, harmful as a result of the stress and blame it shifts
to consumers.314 It serves as a type of “doublespeak.” That is, “language used to
deceive usually through concealment or misrepresentation of truth.”315 Helaine Olen
ponders why financial literacy education persists, notwithstanding the fact that it
fails to benefit both indebted consumers and states: “[p]erhaps because the financial
literacy movement is not led by Good Samaritans. On the contrary, it is led by the
very people who have the most to gain by society’s continued financial ignorance:
the financial services sector.”316 Indeed, as one newspaper editorial has suggested:
There is a persistent myth that [financial literacy] education is the solution,
that well-informed borrowers will protect themselves. But lenders almost
always have more experience and information, and the gap tends to be
largest for the biggest and most consequential transactions . . . A former
Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, wrote in his memoir that the
2008 crisis convinced him to abandon his view that financial consumers
310
Annie-Rose Strasser, McDonalds Tells Workers to Budget by Getting a Second Job
and Turning Off Their Heat, THINK PROGRESS (Jul. 15, 2013), https://thinkprogress.org/
mcdonalds-tells-workers-to-budget-by-getting-a-second-job-and-turning-off-their-heat-c3b
ce1526c1e [https://perma.cc/2VUX-P7KT].
311
Crystal Martin, Cardi B’s Tips for Making ‘Money Moves’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2019), https://nyti.ms/2VzYIxf [https://perma.cc/6KH5-GZSX] (discussing pay parity as a
factor in saving money and paying bills).
312
JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS,
FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 7–9 (2006).
313
Willis, supra note 281, at 208, 260; Lauren Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy,
101 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 433 (2011); OLEN, supra note 256, at 199.
314
Willis, supra note 281, at 260.
315
Jamee K. Moudud, Libertarian Doublespeak: Obscuring Distributional Struggles
Under the Banner of “Economic Liberty,” LAW & POL. ECON. (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://lpeblog.org/2018/04/23/libertarian-doublespeak-obscuring-distributional-strugglesunder-the-banner-of-economic-liberty/#more-642 [https://perma.cc/CY8N-P5BE].
316
OLEN, supra note 256, at 199.
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ought to be responsible for protecting themselves. ‘Like flammable
pajamas, some products should just be kept out of the marketplace.’ Mr.
Bernake wrote.317
That financial literacy curricula fail to address the structural sources of
indebtedness and indigence suggests a need for domestic violence programs to
expand the scope of their approaches. Programs that offer “economic justice
initiatives” that rely on a specious description of economic problems serve to
disempower victims and distract from political and collective solutions.318 These
initiatives serve to adhere to an economy that has contributed to the violence it now
purports to mitigate.319
IV. PARTNER ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS: ERASING THE ECONOMIC320
Some domestic violence scholars have recently expanded their research
agendas to include a more nuanced understanding of the determinants of domestic
violence. Scholarship theorizing household relationships within the context of
political-economic concerns serves to underscore the correlation between economic
strain and increased incidents of IPV.321 Studies in the aftermath of the 2008
recession call attention to the rise of domestic violence as a result of economic

317

Editorial, There’s Only One Way to Stop Predatory Lending, N.Y. TIMES (May 23,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/opinion/trump-cfpb.html [https://perma.cc/U6
P2-SZDL].
318
ARTHUR, supra note 277, at 12 (critiquing financial literacy education as aiding in
“delegitimizing collective risk solutions and unjustly holds individual consumers responsible
for economic risks they cannot manage”).
319
Nicholas J. Kiersey, Everyday Neoliberalism and the Subjectivity of Crisis: PostPolitical Control in an Era of Financial Turmoil, 4 J. CRITICAL GLOBALISATION STUD. 23,
24 (2011) (observing how neoliberal discourses avoid discussing the role of capitalism and
the crises it engenders).
320
These programs are often referred to as Batterers Intervention Programs or Abuser
Treatment Programs. See MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES AND STANDARDS FOR THE
CERTIFICATION OF INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 2 (2015),
https://www.mass.gov/files/documents/2016/07/si/bi-guidelines.pdf
[hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES].
321
See Weissman, supra note 12, at 415–417; Michael L. Benson et al., Violence in
Families: The Intersection of Race, Poverty, and Community Context, IN FAM., CRIME, &
CRIM. JUST., 91 (Greer Litton Fox & Michael L. Benson eds., 2000); A. Rachel Camp,
Pursuing Accountability for Perpetrators of Intimate Partner Violence: The Perils (and the
Utility) of Shaming, 98 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1677, 1718–1720 (2018); Fox & Benson, supra
note 13, at 1–6; Daniel Schneider et al., Intimate Partner Violence in the Great Recession,
53 DEMOGRAPHY 471, 472 (2016) (showing that rapid increases in unemployment rates
during the Great Recession were associated with increases in men’s abusive behavior).
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hardship.322 Telephone calls to the National Domestic Violence Hotline have
increased dramatically during periods when household finances decline and
financial strain increases.323 The judicial system has tracked significant hikes in the
number of family violence case filings due to economic downturn.324 Surveys of
domestic violence shelters reveal increased numbers of victims seeking help during
periods of economic decline.325 Staff identified financial strain as a primary cause of
the increase in violence.326
Many anti-domestic violence scholars have acknowledged that eliminating
male poverty is fundamental to efforts to mitigate this social problem.327 Others note
the conditions that provide context for addressing domestic violence, for example,
the dismantling of the safety net, “trickle-down economics” with devastating
consequences for the poor, and seek to persuade that a meaningful movement to end
domestic violence must attend to the systems of oppression that affect those who

322

See, e.g., The Continued Importance of the Violence Against Women Act: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary: Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 405
(2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56212/html/CHRG-111shrg56212.
htm [https://perma.cc/2QQF-B3LG] (colloquy between Senator Patrick Leahy and Catherine
Pierce, Office of Violence Against Women regarding the impact of the economic crisis and
unemployment on rising rates of domestic violence); Domestic Abuse on Rise as Economy
Sinks, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30156918/ns/health-health_
care/t/domestic-abuse-rise-economy-sinks/#.US0txGeZHnh
[https://perma.cc/N5K9BWMT] [hereinafter Domestic Abuse on Rise]; Philip N. Cohen, Recession Begets Family
Violence, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 2, 2010, 9:01 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
philip-n-cohen/recession-begets-family-v_b_409502.html [https://perma.cc/VS92-XVLC];
On a Losing Streak, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2011, at 35, 36 (describing how the foreclosure crisis
contributes to increasing rates of domestic violence and family dysfunction).
323
Domestic Abuse on Rise, supra note 322; see also Ian Urbina, Philadelphia to
Handle Abuse Calls Differently, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2009, at A13 (noting an increase in
domestic violence calls due to the recession after a fifteen-year decrease); Nabenita Pal, Cuts
Threaten Civil Legal Aid, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 22, 2011),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/cuts-threaten-civil-legal-aid [https://perma.cc/DL2
L-WG2M] (observing a jump in domestic violence calls during the recession).
324
William Glaberson, The Recession Begins Flooding into the Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2009, at A1.
325
See, e.g., “Mary Kay Truth about Abuse” Survey, National Findings from Third
Survey of Domestic Violence Shelters in the United States, NAT’L CTR. ON DOMESTIC &
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 2–4 (Apr. 2011), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/marykay_truthabout
abusesurvey_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/FVS5-MMLG].
326
Id.
327
Jody Raphael, Rethinking Criminal Justice Responses to Intimate Partner Violence,
10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1354, 1364 (2004); Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting
Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28
NEW ENG. L. REV. 929, 985 (1994) (recommending the study of facilitating employment for
perpetrators as a means to lower recidivism rates).
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harm as well as those who are harmed.328 Simply stated, economic crisis and the
resulting loss of employment must be addressed as a means to mitigate domestic
violence. Nonetheless, addressing the economic circumstances of an abusive partner
is often not considered a strategy to mitigate domestic violence.329 The failure to pay
attention to the economic circumstances of an abusive partner is best evidenced by
a review of abuser treatment programs.330
A. Abuser Treatment Programs: Laws, Purpose, and Design
Abuser treatment programs were established during the 1970s and expanded
rapidly during the decades that followed.331 As domestic violence remedies
increasingly resorted to the criminal justice system, at least forty-eight states, as well
as the federal government, enacted statutes authorizing treatment programs as
sentencing options.332 Judges in civil cases are also statutorily authorized to order
defendants to attend a treatment program as part of a domestic violence protection
order.333 State statutes mandate standards and guidelines and designate agencies,
often housed within the criminal justice system, to approve and monitor these

328

Kirsten Faisal, Beyond the Criminal Justice System: A White Paper of the Iowa
Coalition Against Domestic Violence (ICADV), 36 COALITION CHRONICLES END DOMESTIC
ABUSE WI. 4, 5, 8, 9 (Oct. 2017), http://s3-us-east-2.amazonaws.com/edaw-webinars/wpcontent/uploads/2019/01/07163908/Chronicles-36-2VVFOwp.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TBYA3JK] (asking for assistance for perpetrators who cannot be “thrown away or sacrificed”).
329
Daniel Hatcher has suggested that poor fathers might be considered “a fellow victim
of poverty’s wrath, and potential partner towards the cure.” See Hatcher, supra note 209, at
777.
330
Abuser Treatment Programs are also called Batterers Intervention Programs. See
infra note 331. There are a number of issues and concerns with regard to these programs.
This Article limits its review to whether and how programs attend to the economic
circumstances of the abuser insofar as they may contribute to acts of violence.
331
See Amanda Dekki, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for State-Mandated
Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases, 18 ST. JOHN’S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 549, 565–66 (2004); David Adams, Certified Batterer Intervention
Programs: History, Philosophies, Techniques, Collaborations, Innovations and Challenges,
http://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Children_and_Families/Certified%20
Batterer%20Intervention%20Programs.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6NR-5N4D] (last visited
July 18, 2019).
332
Adams, supra note 331, at 2; see also CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
MENU OF STATE BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAM LAWS 1–2 (Jan. 29, 2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/menu-batterer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W9BF-FUGM]
[hereinafter BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAM LAWS]. The Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which included as a subsection the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, also included batterer treatment programs as a sentencing tool. Pub. L. No. 103322, tit. IV, § 320921, 108 Stat. 1902, 2130 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a) (2012)).
333
See BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAM LAWS, supra note 332, at 2, 3, 4, 5.
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programs.334 Also, mainstream domestic violence coalitions are often tasked with
the development of standards and program oversight.335
Abuser treatment programs were originally designed to address heterosexual
male violence against female partners.336 The two principal models, Emerge and the
Duluth Model, were established in 1977 and 1980 respectively and have served as
the prototype for national programs.337 The Duluth Model is the most widely
replicated program and has remained largely committed to certain tenets that include
keeping the victim safe, batterer accountability, and psychoeducational
methodologies to teach batterers to recognize patriarchy and male privilege as a
means of stopping the violence.338 The Emerge program considers domestic violence
within the context of “oppression and social hierarchy” and, like the Duluth model,
relies on the “symbolic battered woman” and the abuser as “a person with personal
failings” as the basis for its programming.339 Most programs call for forging and
334
Id. at 1. In order to assess abuser treatment programs including their model
descriptions, criteria, and requirements, a survey was undertaken that examined every
program in the fifty states. The survey used LexisAdvance for each state and filtered the
results to regulations, statutes, and administrative codes that used the term “batterer.”
Additional searches used the search term “batterer intervention programs” for all states.
Individual program searches were also undertaken where states that did not otherwise have
readily available information through LexisAdvance. Nearly every state indicated victim
safety and batterer accountability as the fundamental program purposes. The survey cannot
reach beyond the information on program websites and the author acknowledges that the
practices of each program cannot be fully ascertained. Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/
Treatment Programs (2018) (on file with author). Some states, such as Massachusetts and
Virginia, create certification standards through boards composed of criminal justice and
other service providers; others are within the province of state Attorney’s General offices.
Id.
335
See Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs, supra note 334.
336
Adams, supra note 331, at 1.
337
DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS: HOME OF THE DULUTH MODEL,
https://www.theduluthmodel.org/ [https://perma.cc/NU9R-97EN] (last visited July 21,
2019); see Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Stereotyped Offender: Domestic Violence and the
Failure of Intervention, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 337, 360 (2015) (surveying 46 jurisdictions to
assess batterer intervention programs).
338
Ramsey, supra note 337, at 363–64; see also KATHLEEN J. FERRARO, BATTERED
WOMEN’S JUST. PROJECT, CURRENT RESEARCH ON BATTERERS INTERVENTION PROGRAMS
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 1 (2017), https://www.bwjp.org/assets/batterer-interventionpaper-final-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WQG-CJ6Q]; What Is the Duluth Model?,
DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS: HOME OF THE DULUTH MODEL,
https://www.theduluthmodel.org/what-is-the-duluth-model/
[https://perma.cc/8ALGB57W] (last visited July 21, 2019); Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs,
supra note 334.
339
EMERGE, https://www.emergedv.com [https://perma.cc/M2H6-N92L] (last visited
July 21, 2019); Goals for Program Members, EMERGE, https://www.emergedv.com/goalsfor-group-members.html [https://perma.cc/3TF2-2KAP] (last visited July 21, 2019)
(focusing on accountability goals); Faisal, supra note 328, at 5. Some states are
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maintaining relationships, primarily with criminal justice system actors including
police, prosecutors, prisons, and probation.340
In nearly all programs, the abuser pays fees associated with the program,
including the costs of assessment, orientation fees, and per-class costs that range
from $370 to $1,000.341 Fees may be assessed at a sliding scale, but programs have
decreed that, as a matter of accountability, some payment must be made
notwithstanding a participant’s indigence.342 Moreover, programs do not allow the
abuser to seek insurance coverage for program costs, even if available.343 A number
of programs seek to impose jail time on participants who fail to attend or otherwise
do not complete the program, which may include failure to pay program fees.344
Some programs acknowledge unemployment to be a demographic risk factor
in domestic violence and include intake questions that seek information regarding
an abuser’s employment history.345 One program categorizes abusers with
experimenting with new models, for example the state of Iowa has begun to pilot a program
called Achieving Change Through Values-Based Behavior based on acceptance and
mindfulness. See also Sarah Boden, Iowa Tries a New Domestic Violence Intervention:
Mindfulness, NPR (Oct. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/21/558623534/iowa-triesa-new-domestic-violence-intervention-mindfulness [https://perma.cc/ZY7N-8GNP].
340
What Is the Duluth Model?, supra note 338.
341
The actual costs may be higher as they are just estimates based on the programs that
disclose their fees. Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs, supra note 334. For
example, Arkansas charges $370 for the 52-hour program, while Georgia’s classes can cost
as much as $720. Arizona Domestic Violence Classes Online, DV CLASS,
https://www.dvclass.com/Domestic-Violence-Classes/Arizona.aspx [https://perma.cc/G6Z
B-CFYG] (last visited July 18, 2019).
342
For example, Massachusetts and Oregon require community service if a participant
is indigent and cannot pay fees. Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs, supra
note 334.
343
Id. Examples of this occur in Nebraska, North Carolina (abuse is not a mental
condition but a “behavioral choice”), and Utah.
344
Id. (listing Alaska, Arkansas, some California programs, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, and Virginia).
345
Id. (listing Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin); see
also Ct. Criminal Justice Advisory Commission, Ct. Domestic Violence Offender Program
Standards,
STATE
OF
CONN.
JUDICIAL
BRANCH
(Sept.
25,
2014),
https://www.jud.ct.gov/faq/DVOffenderProgramStandards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BA8GHDA4]; COLO. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENDER MANAGEMENT BOARD, COLO. DIVISION OF
CRIM. JUST., COLORADO STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT WITH COURT ORDERED DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE OFFENDERS 165 (2008), http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/dvomb/Standards/standards.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QMA9-X3TS] [hereinafter COLORADO STANDARDS] (noting that those
with employment are more likely to successfully complete the program); Jesse Hansen,
Standards for Treatment with Court-Ordered Domestic Violence Offenders: A Process
Evaluation,
COLO.
DIVISION
OF
CRIM.
JUST.
(May
2016),
https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/dvomb/Research/Evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5J9-DS5Y]
(comparing femicide perpetrators with other abusive men, and finding that unemployment
was the most important demographic risk factor for acts of intimate partner femicide); What
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troublesome employment histories as in need of “high intensity” intervention.346 Yet
only two programs appear to address joblessness as a condition relevant to the
mitigation of abuse.347 Unemployment is addressed as an individualized
criminogenic factor without reference to the structural obstacles that prevent
individuals from engaging in the workplace.348 A Department of Justice-funded
study examining educational topics thought to be relevant by program staff reveals
that joblessness and economic inequality were not ranked.349 The Center for Disease
Control’s compilation of batterer treatment program laws similarly fails to address
employment-related assistance, financial difficulties, and credit and indebtedness
concerns.350 Indeed, programs that assign “high intensity” intervention to individuals
because of a troubled employment history do not address job skills, the condition of
the labor market, or job training.351 Instead, they may require an abuser to obtain
employment as a condition of compliance, whereupon staff are required to monitor
employment status and report failures to obtain employment to criminal justice
actors.352
B. Abuser Treatment Programs: Eliding the Economic
Abuser treatment program curricula are not static. Indeed, over the past
decades, standards have adapted to address language needs, as well as partner abuse
committed by women against men and between LGBTQ couples.353 Yet, the

Is the Duluth Model?, supra note 338 (lacking reference to economic circumstances of the
perpetrator); see also Ramsey, supra note 337, at 378–412 (noting that Ohio was the only
exception where a program identified poverty and unemployment as factors to be
considered).
346
See, e.g., COLORADO STANDARDS, supra note 345, at 35.
347
See OHIO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE NETWORK, OHIO STANDARDS FOR BATTERERS
INTERVENTION 12 (Aug. 2010), http://www.odvn.org/Resource%20Center/BI_Standards_
2010__Final3_Ohio.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF7U-ZANY] (noting that the Appalachian
region faces particular challenges, including poverty and unemployment and requiring state
programs to “be aware how these factors may affect victim safety”). Massachusetts standards
reference referrals to other agencies, including those that might assist with employment
training, with the caveat that such training is supplemental to abuser treatment. See
MASSACHUSETTS GUIDELINES, supra note 320, at 2.
348
COLORADO STANDARDS, supra note 345, at 110, 133.
349
See DAG MACLEOD ET AL., NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERVICE, BATTERER
INTERVENTION SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA: AN EVALUATION 37–47 (June 2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/230702.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FJ6-YAMJ].
350
See STATE BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAM LAWS, supra note 332.
351
Id. at 35, 42, 134.
352
Id. at 42, 134 (describing monitoring with probation officers).
353
Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs, supra note 334 (giving an
example that Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Rhode Island require language
accessibility, and that Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio,
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dominant paradigm continues to emphasize patriarchy in opposite-sex relationships
to the near exclusion of other systems of oppression. As Professor Rachel Camp has
noted with regard to these programs:
their lack of success arises from a failure to prioritize internal
accountability . . . [O]nly three jurisdictions list the therapeutic
rehabilitation of the offender as a goal. In light of this and of the limited
success rates of DVIPs generally, external accountability (through
retribution) appears to be the accountability goal prioritized for this most
prevalent treatment intervention.354
Camp also observes that “[b]eyond critiques of the effectiveness of the content of
the curriculum, DVIPs [Domestic Violence Intervention Programs] have been
criticized for how they essentialize and shame perpetrators.”355
The failure of abuser treatment programs to address larger political-economic
concerns, including economic strain and employment-related problems, may reflect
legal requirements associated with program certification requirements well as an
ideological blind spot about the dimensions of domestic violence.356 As noted above,
program standards are often restricted by state regulations, enforced by criminal
justice agencies, and implemented by mainstream domestic violence groups.357
Indeed, accountability, not rehabilitation, is the stated goal of nearly all programs.358
Individual behavioral disorders, including substance abuse, mental health, and
communication deficits, are considered incidental to the dynamic of domestic
violence—viewed principally as a condition of patriarchy and male privilege—to be
treated separately.359
Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia have programs for women abusers although they tend
to be shorter than those for men); see also Ramsey, supra note 337, 378–412.
354
Camp, supra note 321, at 1713 (internal quotations omitted).
355
Id.
356
See PATRICIA CLUSS & ALINA BODEA, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BATTERER
INTERVENTION PROGRAMS 15–16
(Mar. 2011), http://fisafoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/BIPsEffectiveness.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA5S-6M72].
357
See Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs, supra note 334 and
accompanying text (noting the program standards or “best practices” in the states of
Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin are developed or monitored or
otherwise guided by domestic violence programs); see also Briana Barocas et al., Changing
the Domestic Violence Narrative: Aligning Definitions and Standards, 31 J. FAM. VIOL. 941,
942–943, (2016).
358
Ramsey, supra note 337, at 376 (noting that only 3 out of 46 jurisdictions listed
offender rehabilitation as a goal).
359
Batterer/Abuser/Intervention/Treatment Programs, supra note 334 (giving as an
example that Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Utah, Washington—are all indicating the need to treat, for example,
substance as an unrelated matter); see also Ramsey, supra note 337, at 378 (noting that
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Program standards may be unduly retributive for abusers who have suffered
financial hardships and lack the means to pay fees. Notwithstanding guidelines that
promulgate sliding scale fees, studies demonstrate that fees are problematic and
frequently resulted in the participant’s inability to comply.360 Public defender
attorneys have indicated that their indigent clients “were often not told of slidingscale fees, could not add community service onto their already strapped schedules,
and were often presented with a choice between paying for groceries or paying for
the program.”361 As noted above, failure to pay fees may result in a determination
that a participant failed to comply with program requirements, and thus he is
subjected to additional court sanctions. Yet, studies demonstrate that assessments as
to a defendant’s ability to pay are fraught with problems.362 These determinations
are often abbreviated and made in courts without records, where defendants are
without legal counsel.363 In some instances, a hearing may not be held at all.364
Notwithstanding studies that point to the importance of alleviating economic
stress as a way to mitigate domestic violence, most programs ignore the obstacle
abusers may face in efforts at gainful employment.365 Programs professing to
ameliorate economic abuse suffered by victims are unlikely to succeed without
acknowledging that the abuser himself may be a victim of pernicious economic
forces, including predatory lending, credit discrimination, and other unlawful credit
practices.366
It would be unduly facile to posit that domestic violence is wholly attributable
to the economic dislocation experienced by perpetrators. To privilege patriarchy as
the dominant paradigm with which to address domestic violence, however, implies
the need to recognize the cultural environment and economic circumstances to
individuals with mental health or substance abuse may be banned from the program, referred
out, but are not treated for such problems as part of the abuser treatment program).
360
SUSIE MASON DOSIK, ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, BATTERER INTERVENTION
PROGRAMS: STAKEHOLDER OBSERVATIONS 7 (Aug. 2011) (recognizing the difficulties posed
by fees); see also MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 349, at 110–11.
361
DOSIK, supra note 360, at 13.
362
Christopher D. Hampson, The New American Debtors’ Prisons, 44 AM. J. CRIM. L.
1, 10 (2016) (noting that “many courts fail to hold these hearings—or, if they do, they may
last only as long as two minutes”); see also NAGRECHA ET AL., supra note 197.
363
Hampson, supra note 362, at 10.
364
Id.; see also ACLU OF TEXAS, NO EXIT, TEXAS: MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS
AND THE POVERTY TRAP 5–7 (Nov. 2016), https://www.aclutx.org/sites/default/files/field_
documents/debtorsprisonfinal_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VR37-BJBK].
365
Angela Cai, Insuring Children Against Parental Incarceration Risk, 26 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 91, 121 (2014) (describing the job challenges facing economically
disadvantaged parents who have committed criminal acts); see also Youths, Blacks,
Hispanics Most Likely to Be Working Poor, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 16, 2002),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2002/apr/wk3/art02.htm [https://perma.cc/KKK7-TPNV].
366
Hatcher, supra note 209, at 775–76 (critiquing policies that treat men “as an enemy
to be pursued rather than a fellow victim of poverty’s wrath, and potential partner towards
the cure”); see also Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit, supra note 52, at 419.
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which male privilege is subject. There is a sociology of patriarchy which functions
within and is acted upon by an ever-changing political economy. The absence of a
social justice framework beyond patriarchy limits efforts to address the determinants
of this social problem. As one researcher has observed:
the psychological and behavioural emphases of the discourse tend to depoliticise discussion of these connections, confining attention to the
gender questions of what it means to be a (non-violent) man, neglecting
the political questions of what it means for men (and women) to create a
less violent and more just world.367
As a result of the failure to include the political-economic framework of domestic
violence, current abuser treatment programs are inadequately equipped to succeed
with the tasks at hand.368 Without attending to socioeconomic inequality, the risk of
individuals engaging in abusive behavior, often as the very result of such inequality,
will not be sufficiently minimized.369
V. EMERGING MODELS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADVOCACY STRATEGIES
There is a growing interest within the anti-domestic violence movement to
address economic issues through the development of new programmatic approaches
and interventions. Important alternative models have emerged designed to
ameliorate economic abuse while challenging the ideology of unfettered markets.370
At the same time, debates about abuser treatment programs’ effectiveness have
intensified.371 Frustration born of research findings that suggest current models have
failed to improve outcomes has encouraged a discourse about such programs and
has served to create an opening for consideration of a greater focus on social justice
interventions.372 A review of these programmatic efforts, discussed below, suggests

367

Alan Greig, Political Connections: Men, Gender, and Violence 2 (United Nations
International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women, Working
Paper No. 1, 2001), http://menengage.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Political_Connect
ions_-_Men_Gender_and_Violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FRB-UM7T].
368
See CLUSS & BODEA, supra note 356, at 10, 15 (showing that the more rigorous the
study, the less encouraging the findings); Julia C. Babcock et al., Does Batterers’ Treatment
Work? A Meta-Analytic Review of Domestic Violence Treatment, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
REV. 1023, 1028–30 (2004) (noting that treatment programs have only a small effect).
369
KEITH PAYNE, THE BROKEN LADDER: HOW INEQUALITY AFFECTS THE WAY WE
THINK, LIVE, AND DIE 76 (2017).
370
See discussion infra Sections V.A., V.B.
371
EDWARD W. GONDOLF, GENDER-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON BATTERER PROGRAMS:
PROGRAM LEADERS ON HISTORY, APPROACH, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT,
INTRODUCTION- RESPECT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND JUSTICE xi (2015).
372
Id.
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opportunities to develop solutions within the interconnectedness of the political
economy and domestic violence.
A. The Center for Survivor Agency and Justice
The Center for Survivor Agency and Justice (“CSAJ”) is a national
organization established in 2011 focused on the relationship between poverty and
domestic violence and the remediation of economic abuse.373 The organization
describes its work as “foster[ing] systemic change that better aligns what
communities provide with what works to meet the comprehensive, self-defined
needs of IPV survivors.”374
CSAJ recognizes the need to challenge inequitable laws as a means of structural
reforms on behalf of domestic violence victims and to address inequality and poverty
more generally.375 To that end, CSAJ enacts a law and political economy approach
to civil litigation to prohibit predatory and other wrongful debt collection practices,
credit and housing discrimination matters, as well as federal tax advocacy.376
Relying on protective federal and state consumer laws, including the Truth in
Lending Act, the Military Lending Act, state unfair and deceptive trade practices
statutes, and licensing laws, CSAJ seeks to redistribute the burdens of the current
financial industry.377 In the realm of family law litigation, CSAJ also includes an
analysis of the institutional power bearing on economic abuse.378 CSAJ staff have
developed the expertise to assess the financial consequences when a survivor must
choose between public assistance and family law-related economic relief.379
In the realm of economic justice initiatives and advocacy, CSAJ distinguishes
itself from other programs that address survivor “deficits” rather than confronting
373

See CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST., https://csaj.org [https://perma.cc/6E3NACU6] (last visited July 18, 2019).
374
Our Work, CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST., https://csaj.org/work/
[https://perma.cc/8KL5-HMR6] (last visited July 18, 2019). It “envisions a world where all
people have equal access to physical safety, economic security, and human dignity.” Vision,
CTR.
FOR
SURVIVOR
AGENCY
&
JUST.,
https://csaj.org/mission/#vision
[https://perma.cc/YL9F-2ABQ] (last visited July 18, 2019).
375
ERICA A. SUSSMAN & SARA WEE, CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST.,
ACCOUNTING FOR SURVIVORS’ ECONOMIC SECURITY: AN ATLAS FOR DIRECT SERVICE
PROVIDERS 51 (2017), https://csaj.org/document-library/CSAJ_Atlas_Mapbook_1_FINAL_
TO_POST.pdf [https://perma.cc/23R6-YS2S].
376
See Our Work, supra note 374.
377
CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST., GUIDEBOOK ON CONSUMER AND ECONOMIC
CIVIL LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR SURVIVORS: A COMPREHENSIVE AND SURVIVOR-CENTERED
GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ATTORNEYS AND LEGAL ADVOCATES 40–41, 43–44, 129
(2017),
https://csaj.org/document-library/CSAJ_Guidebook_COMPLETE.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2TQ-Y75U].
378
Id.
379
Id. at 179 (arguing that “the decision to pursue economic relief [per family law
remedies] must be grounded in the survivor’s own risk assessment”).
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the social structures that obstruct economic well-being and security.380 For example,
its approach to restoring a victim’s credit worthiness prioritizes payment of debts
based on her needs as opposed to the interests of credit industries.381 CSAJ staff
produce comprehensive training materials on broad topics related to consumer and
civil economic rights and protections.382 They promote litigating predatory lending
practices and other institutionalized unfair debt practices that burden victims. Just
as importantly, CSAJ challenges the “institutional ideology” of domestic violence
programs; its staff is committed to strategies of collaboration, intentional about
coalition building, and dedicated to “learn[ing] from and build[ing] partnerships
across disciplines.”383 The organization collaborates with individuals and social
justice agencies in order to address multiple issues, including race and ethnicity,
consumer rights, housing and foreclosure defense, and urban poverty.384 It identifies
the need for advocates to create “a partnership between the DV, anti-poverty, and
anti-racist fields that attends to the ways in which physical and economic risks facing
survivors fundamentally shape their opportunities for securing safety.”385 Success is
measured by the outcome of organizational strategies upon both the survivor and the
community.386 By working among diverse constituencies and across different
disciplines, CSAJ provides political alternatives to address the economic
consequences of IPV.
B. Emerging Political-Economic Perspectives for Partner Abuse Treatment
Programs
Also worthy of emulation is the Alma Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a
center which works with men with a history of domestic violence and which serves
as a model program to address the political-economic determinants of such
violence.387 The Center partners with workforce and small business development
380

See SUSSMAN & WEE, supra note 375.
See CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST., supra note 377, at 58.
382
Id.
383
Id. at 14.
384
Project
Partners,
CTR.
FOR
SURVIVOR
AGENCY
&
JUST.,
https://csaj.org/about/#project-partners [https://perma.cc/5CBS-Q9M2] (last visited July 18,
2019).
385
KATIE VONDELINDE ET AL., CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST., A GUIDE TO
CONSUMER & ECONOMIC CIVIL LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR SURVIVORS: AN INTRODUCTION 29
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://csaj.org/document-library/CSAJ_Consumer_Issue_Spotting_
HANDOUT.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2RX-4KG2].
386
See, e.g., CTR. FOR SURVIVOR AGENCY & JUST., CONSUMER RIGHT TRAINING
TOOLKIT: STRATEGIC ACTION PLANNING WORKSHEET, https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UV
kdzFWZ44Br1zv5bkAntyN5DyfPHlMt/view [https://perma.cc/W5MU-LNBQ] (last visited
July 18, 2019).
387
Michael Jahr, Breaking the Cycle, in UNLOCKING POTENTIAL, WISC. POL’Y RES.
INST. 26 (2016), https://www.badgerinstitute.org/BI-Files/Special-Reports/Reports381
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programs to assist perpetrators in obtaining employment.388 These employmentrelated services anticipate that perpetrators will have setbacks that might hinder
work-related success and compliance issues and thus build in programmatic support
in lieu of termination and punishment.389 In addition, the San Francisco Local Child
Support Enforcement Agency, although not exactly an abuser treatment program,
provides educational and employment-related training to fathers identified as
perpetrators of domestic violence.390
New studies have recognized the importance of economic resources and
employment assistance to batterers in order to improve outcomes in abusers.391 The
failure to address these matters has been described as the “most ardently discussed
missed prevention opportunity.”392 Given the heightened debate about the efficacy
of abuser treatment programs and concerns that no existing model has reduced IPV,
some program staff have called for the development of new “principles of respect,
accountability, and social justice–principles that often get overlooked in the
prevalent re-conception of programming as merely service delivery or psychological
treatment.”393 Although studies document resistance to change, interviews with
abuser treatment program directors and staff revealed their interest in a
“commitment to social justice and social change” and their recognition of the
benefits of addressing multiple oppressions as strategies to reduce gender
violence.394 As evidence of promising developments, more recently, abuser
treatment programs have called for programmatic shifts to revise the curriculum to
include race, class, and other intersectional oppressions.395

Documents/Unlocking_Potential_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV8N-F6NU] (focusing on
abuser trauma as well as their abusive childhood experiences).
388
Id. at 28.
389
Michael Jahr, Removing Barriers to Employment, in UNLOCKING POTENTIAL, WISC.
POL’Y RES. INST. 32 (2016), https://www.badgerinstitute.org/BI-Files/SpecialReports/Reports-Documents/Unlocking_Potential_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VV8NF6NU] (quoting one program participant: “Other people, they help you find a job and then
let you go.” But the MJW staff works with you “no matter what.”).
390
See OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
NO. 7, PROMOTING CHILD WELL-BEING & FAMILY SELF-SUFFICIENCY 2,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocse/family_violence_collaboration.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QM6-PEYU].
391
Courtenay Silvergleid Wallpe, Engaging a Systems Approach to Evaluate Domestic
Violence Intervention with Abusive Men: Reassessing the Role of Community, PORTLAND
ST. U. DISSERTATIONS & THESES 349 (2010).
392
Id.
393
GONDOLF, supra note 371, at xi.
394
Id. at vi, xvii, vii, 19 (noting interviewee commentary).
395
Id. at 26.
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VI. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the ways that domestic violence impairs the economic
citizenship of victims implies the need to interrogate the ways that politicaleconomic arrangements affect the usefulness of the law and advocacy initiatives,
neither of which operate outside of a political-economic context. The challenges of
using law and advocacy strategies as a remedy to gender violence are formidable,
given that “neoliberal rationality disseminates the model of the market to all domains
and activities – even where money is not at issue – and configures human beings
exhaustively as market actors, always, only, and everywhere as homo
economicus.”396 Efforts to address domestic violence—shaped by economic
uncertainty and inequality—require new forms of advocacy to embrace a vision for
socioeconomic rights and to reject reliance on market-oriented “solutions” that, in
the end, are not solutions at all. As Professor Samuel Moyn has written in the context
of human rights work, “advocates can work to extricate themselves from their
neoliberal companionship.”397
The work of CSAJ offers promising relief for individuals and communities
when such interventions are focused on structural inequalities and the intersecting
experiences of gender violence and poverty.398 Relatedly, scholars in collaboration
with the Institute on Inequality and Democracy have suggested that the term
“debtor” implies a political identity around which collective organizing has and can
be accomplished to discharge mass indebtedness and reject “illegitimate debts.”399
Anti-domestic violence initiatives should embrace these efforts and endeavor to
create a “moral economy” to address economic inequality as central to their IPV
agenda.400 Domestic violence programs may brand their efforts to address the
economic consequences of IPV as “economic justice initiatives,” but they offer little
justice when programmatic efforts are tied to a political-economic system that
exacerbates systemic poverty, and thus IPV.
Similarly, innovative programming offered by the Alma Center facilitates
intervention with abusive partners whose behaviors are shaped by and enacted
within the political-economic realities of their day-to-day lives.401 Scholars who
have studied intervention strategies with low-income noncustodial fathers with
unstable employment work have identified criteria for intervention and promote a

396
WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION
31 (2015).
397
SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 11 (2018).
398
See supra Section IV.A.
399
APPEL ET AL., supra note 264, at 35, 39, 45–50 (while acknowledging limits,
describing successful grassroots campaigns both in and outside of the United States to target
the problem of indebtedness as a failure of government and financial markets).
400
See Hawkes, supra note 259.
401
See discussion supra Section V.B.
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“dignity litmus test,” which includes the provision of economic resources.402
Meaningful intervention is unlikely without addressing poverty and social inequality
in order to “dismantle what produces and perpetuates domestic violence.”403
Advocates would do well to acknowledge the relationship between economic
and legal matters and seek to “reallocate[ ] rights to advance general human
needs.”404 Law reform for the purpose of addressing domestic violence must avoid
reprivatizing IPV and encourage public structural remedies to address private
dilemmas. Market-centric reforms promise little amelioration to the harms suffered
by victims. Effective remedies to gender violence and its consequences require a
critical perspective of the political-economic forces that shape the behavior of
perpetrators and that disempower victims.
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